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Dissolution and Rational Choice: The Unique
Remedial Framework for Director Deadlock
Under the Illinois Business Corporation Act
BY KENNETH J. VANKO1
This article discusses the remedy of judicial dissolution in the context of
an Illinois corporation facing management deadlock. The particular focus
of this article is on one of the most common corporate structures for small
businesses: the equally-held firm where management rights are
symmetrical with ownership interests. Although courts long have described
dissolution as an extreme and disfavored remedy, they have done so without
reference to the particular factual context unique to deadlocked closelyheld corporations. Illinois has a unique shareholder-relief statute, which
illustrates when dissolution is an appropriate remedy. Based on the
statutory text, I suggest dissolution is a default remedy in deadlock cases
when a petitioning shareholder does not request a buy-out of her shares in
the litigation and when the corporation’s shareholders have failed to
include deadlock avoidance mechanisms in their advance planning
documents. As support, I demonstrate the motivations for why a
shareholder in an equally-split firm may eschew a buy-out remedy
altogether and prefer dissolution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Dissension among small-business owners often is rooted in powerful,
emotional forces: family rivalry, a failure to communicate, and fractious disloyalty to name just a few.2 The possibilities for discord increase when founders elect to split their ownership and management rights equally, leading to
the potential for internal deadlock. To be sure, in a closely-held corporation,3
“deadlock can be especially disabling.”4
The Illinois General Assembly has recognized the problems associated
with shareholder dissension in closely-held, or non-public, corporations. Sec2. See Smith-Shrader Co. v. Smith, 483 N.E.2d 283, 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (refusing to order dissolution when one owner engaged in improper competition against corporation); Kirksey v. Grohmann, 754 N.W.2d 825, 830-31 (S.D. 2008) (ordering dissolution of
equally-split limited liability company when four sisters, two of whom benefited from management deadlock, spoke only through their lawyers).
3. The case of Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583 (Ill. 1964), defines a closelyheld corporation as “one in which the stock is held in a few hands, or in a few families, and
wherein it is not at all, or only rarely, dealt in by buying or selling.” Galler further notes “the
shareholders of a close corporation are often also the directors and officers thereof.” Id. at 584.
4. Diane K. McDonald, Comment, Deadlock and Dissolution in the Close Corporation: Has the Sacred Cow Been Butchered?, 58 NEB. L. REV. 791, 795 (1979).
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tion 12.56 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act (BCA) is a robust substantive and remedial statute that authorizes a court to order equitable relief
in different classes of shareholder disputes.5 One statutory basis for shareholder relief is deadlock between or among directors, those who control the
day-to-day managerial affairs of a corporation.6 Though the entitlement to
relief for deadlock seems unquestioned, the proper remedy is far from clearcut.
In this Article, I examine the remedial structure of section 12.56 and its
application to deadlock claims when there is symmetry between ownership
and management, one of the most common organizational paradigms in
closely-held companies. In doing so, I conclude that a shareholder petitioning
for relief based on deadlock faces a binary choice arising from the statutory
text: an election to sell her shares in the enterprise or a request that the court
dissolve the firm. I also demonstrate that this stark choice directly correlates
to the shareholder’s forward-looking conduct and her desire to remain active
in the corporation’s line of business. Standing in the way of this choice, however, is the rule that dissolution is a drastic remedy courts should not invoke
lightly. I illustrate why this prevailing view of dissolution does not – or
should not – apply to the unique deadlock paradigm. To that end, I argue that
courts ought to view dissolution as presumptively appropriate for deadlock
cases given the high burden of proof a petitioning shareholder must meet
before her entitlement to any relief.
In Part II, I examine the meaning of deadlock through illustrative case
law from Illinois and other jurisdictions. I also analyze the crucial requirement that deadlock must disadvantage the shareholders or lead to going-concern injury.7 Part III demonstrates the textual limitations of section 12.56 as
it pertains to remedial choice in deadlock cases. I then discuss the share-purchase remedy in particular. In doing so, I conclude that the General Assembly’s choice to place this remedy solely within the petitioning shareholder’s
control suggests dissolution is the rational alternative remedy in a deadlock
case when a shareholder desires to remain in the firm’s line of business.8
In Part IV of this Article, I deconstruct the dissolution remedy and show
why courts have viewed it as a drastic remedy for corporations. After reviewing the common-law rules that gave rise to this perception, I posit that a profound disconnect emerges between black-letter historical rules and the
unique factual construct of director deadlock.9 Part V examines advance
planning among shareholder-directors through private contract law. I discuss
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56 (2017).
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(a)(1) (2017).
See infra text accompanying notes 12-102.
See infra text accompanying notes 103-52.
See infra text accompanying notes 153-70.
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sound deadlock avoidance mechanisms that are available to owners of the
equally-divided firm and discuss the inherent limits, both behavioral and
practical, of advance planning.10
Part VI returns to dissolution and reconstructs it from a disfavored remedy under section 12.56 to a default solution in deadlock cases. In this section, I analyze the circumstances in which a petitioning shareholder is motivated to seek dissolution. In doing so, I conclude that dissolution is a preferred remedy if the petitioning shareholder elects not to sell her shares in the
firm and if the shareholders have failed to plan for deadlock in their internal
corporate contracts. In this respect, dissolution follows a shareholder’s rational decision to remain in the same industry as the deadlocked firm, free of
common-law restrictions on competitive conduct.11 Part VII then concludes
the Article.
II.DEFINING CORPORATE DEADLOCK
Deadlock in the closely-held corporation is a function of advance planning among owners. In the simplest case, the corporation’s voting stock is
split equally between two owners (or sometimes two families), who are also
the lone directors.12 Taking it further, the bylaws may require that the owners
elect each other as directors.13 Owners of an equally-split corporation often
lack the foresight to establish an independent board of directors, or one that
is not symmetrically aligned with ownership.14 And even in cases where the
shareholder factions are not equally split, the corporate bylaws may facilitate
deadlock through super-majority voting requirements.15
Although close-corporation owners can avoid deadlock, poor advance
planning does not mean that shareholders lack remedies when serious disputes arise. The BCA enables a court to intervene and order relief that will
cure deadlock. Section 12.56(a)(1) provides that director deadlock is a basis
10. See infra text accompanying notes 171-221.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 222-87.
12. Galler, 203 N.E.2d at 583-84; Bowen v. Bowen-Romer Flour Mills Corp., 217 P.
301, 302 (Kan. 1923). For a case about a corporation with classic deadlock-enabling features,
see Bendetson v. Killarney, Inc., 913 A.2d 756 (N.H. 2006) (affirming order of judicial dissolution).
13. Carlos S. Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock
and Dissolution, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 778, 779 (1952).
14. See Carl Kampel, Why Privately Held and Family-Owned Businesses Should
Have Independent Boards of Directors, FEI (Feb. 12, 2015), https://daily.financialexecutives.org/privately-held-family-owned businesses-independent-boards-directors.
15. See, e.g., Roach v. Bynum, 403 So. 2d 187, 188-91 (Ala. 1981) (noting that bylaw
super-majority voting requirements facilitated hopeless deadlock); Mordka v. Mordka Enters.,
Inc., 693 P.2d 953, 960 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (describing how unanimous voting requirement
over major corporate decisions led to deadlock).
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upon which a shareholder may petition a court for equitable relief.16 This
legislative authorization is hardly unique—as other state corporation laws
enable shareholders to pursue relief for deadlock.17 If a shareholder in an Illinois corporation brings a suit based on director deadlock, the following outline best summarizes the elements she must prove under section 12.56(a)(1):
(1) the directors are deadlocked in the management
of the corporate affairs;
(2) the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock; and (3) either:
(a) actual or threatened irreparable injury to the
corporation, or
(b) the business of the corporation no longer can be
conducted to the general advantage of the shareholders.18
In a firm where management and ownership are symmetrical, the shareholders’ ability to break a deadlock (element 2) is not a genuine point of
contest. Therefore, deadlock cases usually revolve around two questions.
16. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(a)(1) (2017).
17. ALA. CODE § 10A-2-14.30(2)(i) (2017); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.628(b)(2)-(3)
(2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-1430(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2017); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 4-271430(2)(i) (2016); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(2)-(3) (Deering 2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7114-301(2)(a) (2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-896(a)(1) (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
226(a)(2) (2016); D.C. CODE § 29-312.20(a)(2) (2017); FLA. STAT. § 607.1430(2)(a) (2017);
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1430(2)(A) (2016); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-411(2)(A) (2017); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 30-29-1430(2)(a) (2016); IND. CODE § 23-1-47-1(2(A) (2016); IOWA CODE §
490.1430(2)(a) (2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6804(d) (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
271B.14-300(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2016); LA. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1430(A)(2)(a) (2017); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 1430(2)(A) (2016); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 3413(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, § 14.30(2)(i) (2016); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 450.1823(a) (2016); MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(b)(1) (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-414.30(2)(i) (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 351.494(2)(a) (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1938(2)(a) (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2,197(a)(2)(i)(A) (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. §
78.650(1)(d) (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:14.30(2)(i) (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A:12-7(1)(b) (West 2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-16-16(A)(1)(a) (2016); N.Y. BUS. CORP.
LAW § 1104(a)(1) (McKinney 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30(2)(i) (2016); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 10-19.1-115(2)(b)(1) (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.91(A)(4) (LexisNexis
2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1094 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.661(2)(a) (2015); 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 1981(a)(3) (2016); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.2-1314(a)(1)(i) (2017); S.C. CODE ANN. §
33-14-300(2)(i) (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-1A-1430(2)(a) (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. §
48-24-301(2)(A) (2016); TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE ANN. § 11.404(a)(1)(B) (West 2015); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 16-10a-1430(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 14.30(2)(A)
(2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747(A)(1)(a) (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.14.300(2)(a)
(2016); W. VA. CODE § 31D-14-1430(2)(A) (2016); WIS. STAT. § 180.1430(2)(A) (2017);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-1430(a)(ii)(A) (2016).
18. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(a)(1) (2017).
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First, are management difficulties so acute as to constitute true organizational
deadlock? Second, how does deadlock impact the shareholders collectively
or the corporation’s going-concern value?
A.

Paralyzing Disagreement or Mere Dissension: A Study in Pragmatism

Since the BCA provides no definitional help, it is appropriate to look to
the plain meaning of the term “deadlock” and interpretive cases.19 In Illinois,
the starting point is Callier v. Callier, where the appellate court looked to the
dictionary definition of deadlock.20 Callier found that it means “[a] counteraction of things producing entire stoppage; hence, a state of inaction or of
neutralization caused by the opposition of persons or factions, as in a government or in a voting body.”21 The dictionary definition, though, lacks context and provides little help to practitioners. Resorting to other judicial decisions yields some illustrative cases, but no bright-line rules.
The Supreme Court of Alabama has used colorful phrases to suggest a
petitioning shareholder bears a heavy burden to show deadlock. In particular,
it describes deadlock as the “paralysis of corporate function” and an entity
that is “impotent and unable to legally transact any business on account of
the controversy and ill feeling existing between [the shareholders].”22 A
standard that examines whether a company is unable to transact business is
surely the strictest possible deadlock formula. The Court of Appeals of Oregon took a similar, but likely more flexible, approach when it framed deadlock as the “inaction which results when two equally powerful factions stake
out opposing positions and refuse to budge.”23 The most reliable definition
of deadlock may come from Delaware, which requires the directors to be “so
divided respecting the management of the affairs of the corporation that the
required vote for action by the board of directors cannot be obtained and the
stockholders are unable to terminate this division.”24
Regardless of these judicially crafted standards, the meaning of deadlock is entirely contextual. In closely-held corporations, disagreements can
arise in an endless set of fact patterns.25 This makes it difficult to establish
workable parameters in defining deadlock, other than to say that courts must
19. See Rogers v. Imeri, 999 N.E.2d 340, 343 (Ill. 2013) (stating courts should construe statutes according to intent of legislature, which is best determined through “plain and
ordinary meaning”).
20. Callier v. Callier, 378 N.E.2d 405, 408 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
21. Id.
22. Cowin v. Salmon, 28 So. 2d 633, 636 (Ala. 1946).
23. Wilcox v. Stiles, 873 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(2) (2016).
25. See Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 584 (Ill. 1964) (“[A]s in the case at bar, the
shareholders of a close corporation are often also the directors and officers . . . .”).
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retain some flexibility in applying the legal standard.26 A case from the
Northern District of Illinois, Donovan v. Quade, provides a stark example of
deadlock.27 There, the court found irreconcilable deadlock when the directors
operated the company’s two separate branches as if they were different businesses, went without meetings, and had disagreements over distribution of
profits and royalties.28 They also lodged competing accusations of forgery,
mismanagement, fiduciary-duty violations, and failure to account for profits.29 By the time of trial, the parties’ disagreements and conduct towards
each other was so pervasive that there was “no hope” the conduct would ever
change.30 In effect, the directors had disregarded their own corporation, and
their disagreements pervaded the entire purpose for which they pooled their
trust together in the first place. Donovan illustrates that the concept of deadlock must be both forward- and backward-looking. Put differently, a court
generally will need to assess the directors’ past disputes to determine how
likely it is that they can manage a firm in the future, consistent with their
fiduciary obligations.31
By contrast, mere disagreement or dissension is not deadlock.32 Unlike
the dysfunctional entity in Donovan, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the appropriate remedy for a successful, profitable corporation facing
internal strife in the widely-cited case of In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc.33 The
facts there revealed discord between brother and sister, but no fundamental
disagreement over corporate policy. Just as importantly, though, the corporation was highly profitable.34 In fact, the only real point of dispute between
the shareholder-directors seemed to be nonpayment of the petitioner’s salary,
which the court of appeals found “remediable by means other than dissolution.”35 New York’s General Corporation Law allowed for dissolution based
on deadlock, but it did not enable a court to order other forms of equitable
relief. To sustain a finding of deadlock, the petitioning shareholder had to

26. Cf. Ski Roundtop, Inc. v. Hall, 658 P.2d 1071, 1080 (Mont. 1983) (stating that in
cases of shareholder oppression, the legal standard must retain “useful flexibility”).
27. Donovan v. Quade, 830 F. Supp. 2d 460 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
28. Id. at 487-88.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 488.
31. See Anest v. Audino, 773 N.E.2d 202, 209 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (noting that individuals who control corporations owe a fiduciary duty to their corporations and their shareholders).
32. See Renbaum v. Custom Holding, Inc., 871 A.2d 554, 572 (Md. 2005) (“When
dissension is serious enough to reach the stage of deadlock, then a court has the discretion to
order dissolution based on an appropriate evidentiary showing . . . .”).
33. In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 119 N.E.2d 563 (N.Y. 1954).
34. Id. at 564.
35. Id. at 564-65.
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show the parties’ competing interests were “so discordant as to prevent efficient management,” and that the “object of its corporate existence cannot be
attained.”36 Radom & Neidorff sets forth one of the clearest standards for how
to determine whether disagreement rises beyond mere dissension to the level
of true management deadlock.37
Cases from other states illustrate how shareholders can satisfy an exacting deadlock standard. In Handlan v. Handlan, the Supreme Court of Missouri found an obvious case of deadlock when the evenly-divided directors
had “violent disagreement as to business policies and methods.”38 The court
specifically noted that each director “ignored the other in the management of
the business and made decisions” without consulting the other.39 The California Court of Appeal, in Reynolds v. Special Projects, Inc., upheld a finding
of deadlock when the directors disagreed over one of the director’s diversion
of corporate funds for his personal use and over the term of a critical licensing
contract.40 Finally, in Laskey v. L&L Manchester Drive-In, Inc., the Supreme
Court of Maine determined that deadlock existed when there were intense
disagreements over officer and employee compensation and acrimony between director factions that resulted in a loss of communication.41
As these cases suggest, courts are willing to find deadlock in the face of
continuous disagreements, high levels of personal animosity, and facts establishing the impairment of core management functions.42 A number of cases
also have found deadlock when directors disagree over whether to sell real
estate when the company’s sole purpose is to manage real estate.43 This limited-purpose entity seems well-suited for a deadlock analysis because of the

36. Id. at 565 (quoting Hitch v. Hawley, 30 N.E. 401, 404 (N.Y. 1892)).
37. For an example of a case where ancillary disputes among managers do not equate
to deadlock, see Freedman v. Fox, 67 So. 2d 692, 693 (Fla. 1953) (disputes in corporation that
owned hotel involved refusal to repair television sets, disruption of guests’ enjoyment, and
failing to throw holiday parties).
38. Handlan v. Handlan, 232 S.W.2d 944, 951 (Mo. 1950).
39. Id.
40. Reynolds v. Special Projects, Inc., 260 Cal. App. 2d 496, 501 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d
Dist. 1968).
41. Laskey v. L&L Manchester Drive-In, Inc., 216 A.2d 310, 316-17 (Me. 1966); see
also In re Dissolution of T.J. Ronan Paint Corp., 469 N.Y.S.2d 931, 936 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984) (finding deadlock when there was “intense personal hostility [which posed] an irreconcilable barrier to the continued functioning and prosperity of the corporation”).
42. See also Ward v. Ward Farms, Inc., 324 S.E.2d 63, 64 (S.C. 1984) (noting director
obtained court order barring other director from entering corporate property); Leck v. Pugh,
676 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984) (noting equal owners of firm engaged in continual
litigation against each other).
43. Fernandez v. Yates, 145 So. 3d 141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Gillingham v.
Swan Falls Land & Cattle Co., 683 P.2d 895 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984).
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narrow substantive topics on which a shareholder must show director disagreement. Once again, though, the fact-specific nature of these disputes tempers the importance of any one reported deadlock case.44
These cases lead to an intuitive conclusion: the meaning of deadlock is
pragmatic, not formalist. A court hearing a shareholder petition based on
deadlock must engage with the facts pragmatically to conclude whether the
directors merely disagree on some aspects of the business or cannot work
together cooperatively on major decisions affecting the firm’s strategic plans
and overall mission.45 But given the almost infinite number of fact patterns
that can arise in disputes between owner-managers, it is impossible to establish bright-line rules concerning what activity rises to the level of deadlock.46
B.

Self-Dealing: Recasting Deadlock as Oppression

Good-faith disagreements, or even personal animosity between directors, stand in sharp contrast to outright self-dealing and breach of fiduciary
duty.47 On this score, Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co. establishes that
courts will not hesitate to remediate self-dealing when one director uses deadlock to assert control over the company.48 In that case, the president of the
corporation—aligned with one fifty-percent shareholder bloc—effectively
controlled the company’s day-to-day decisions by ignoring the bylaws, refusing to call meetings, and profiting at the corporation’s expense.49 The case
contains no expansive deadlock analysis; in effect, the Supreme Court of Illinois implicitly transformed a deadlock case into one of oppression (now a
44. Appellate courts often discuss deadlock cases under a highly deferential standard
of review, which results in decisions that are of little guidance to practitioners. See, e.g., Levine v. Beem, 608 So. 2d 373 (Ala. 1992); Anderson v. Kinser, 173 N.E.2d 914 (Ind. 1961); In
re Krewe of Crescent City, Inc., 532 So. 2d 897 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
45. See Hall v. Woods, 156 N.E. 258, 267 (Ill. 1927) (stating that it is “within the
power and the duty of the board of directors to control the affairs of the corporation, to fix the
duties of its officers and employees, to adopt by-laws, and to manage the corporate property
and business for the benefit of all the stockholders.”).
46. See Mary Schenk, Judge Orders Investment Firm Dissolved, NEWS-GAZETTE
(Sept. 5, 2014, 9:19 PM), http://www.news-gazette.com/news/local/2014-09-05/judge-ordersinvestment-firm-dissolved.html (discussing judgment of dissolution under section 12.56
which arose out of one director’s separate meritless lawsuit against another director based on
false allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and embezzlement).
47. See Johnson v. Cent. Standard Life Ins. Co., 243 N.E.2d 376, 382-83 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1968) (discussing fiduciary obligations of corporate directors).
48. Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131, 138 (Ill. 1960) (affirming
decree of dissolution); see also Bowen v. Bowen-Romer Flour Mills Corp., 217 P. 301, 303
(Kan. 1923) (stating that in an equally divided firm, “[o]ne group of belligerents has possession of the corporate property and control of its business affairs, and is taking advantage of
the opportunity to oppress the other group.”).
49. Gidwitz, 170 N.E.2d at 138.
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separate basis for shareholder relief under section 12.56) given the president’s blanket assertion of control and his resultant self-dealing.50 Ultimately,
the court found dissolution—the only remedy allowed under the law at the
time—was appropriate.51
Directors sometimes feign deadlock for a tactical advantage. A shareholder-director may feel she is locked into a long-term partnership with
someone she no longer trusts. Or she may believe better opportunities lie
elsewhere. A poorly-constructed shareholder agreement may complicate any
exit strategy and encourage false claims of deadlock. Illinois appellate courts
have addressed these feigned deadlocks twice, in Callier v. Callier52 and
Smith-Shrader Co. v. Smith.53
The court in Callier found no deadlock when two equal shareholders
were unable to agree upon whether to dissolve the corporation voluntarily or
to have one owner buy out the other.54 The court’s determination that no
deadlock existed, however, likely was a product of the petitioning shareholder’s unilateral decision to shut down the business, siphon off all employees and customers, and effectively terminate the operations of a profitable
enterprise.55 Calling this a “flagrant breach of [the director’s] fiduciary duty,”
the court would not reward the plaintiff with a finding of deadlock.56 A similar result followed in Smith-Shrader, which involved one fifty-percent shareholder’s improper pre-termination competition with his own company.57 The
court, relying on Callier, noted the “manifest unfairness of allowing Smith,
who breached his fiduciary duty to S-S, to force dissolution of what is remaining of S-S.”58 Without even discussing the trial court’s sweeping grant
of injunctive relief, the appellate court affirmed a nine-year, customer-based
injunction against Smith.59
Callier and Smith-Shrader are cases of artificial deadlock stemming
from oppression and breach of fiduciary duty. Indeed, feigned deadlock for
individual advantage presumptively should rise to the level of oppressive behavior, which provides a shareholder an independent basis for invoking section 12.56.60 A shareholder’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty is a close
cousin of oppression; though depending on the facts, the action may belong
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Callier v. Callier, 378 N.E.2d 405 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
53. Smith-Shrader Co. v. Smith, 483 N.E.2d 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
54. Callier, 378 N.E.2d at 408-09.
55. Id. at 407-08.
56. Id.; cf. Lien v. Lien, 674 N.W.2d 816, 823-24 (S.D. 2004) (holding that shareholder could not create deadlock artificially by refusing to attend meetings).
57. Smith-Shrader, 483 N.E.2d at 291.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 285.
60. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(a)(3) (2017).
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to the firm and not the shareholder.61 If a shareholder establishes self-dealing
through a fiduciary duty claim, a court is likely to find that this is indeed a
derivative action.62 Section 12.56, however, is an express grant of authority
for a shareholder to bring an individual action, and she may wish to avoid the
procedural nuances of pursuing a derivative claim.63 Equating a fiduciary
breach to oppression, and proceeding directly, seems the better route for
shareholders to take.64
Deadlock and oppression claims also differ qualitatively. On the one
hand, conduct resulting in deadlock is not necessarily wrongful.65 A court
may order relief even if it finds both sides share blame.66 Oppression, though,
is of a different ilk. An oppression claim connotes heavy-handed conduct by
one party against another, even if the conduct stops short of outright fraud.67
In the proper case, it can lead to collateral remedies such as an award of damages or fee-shifting.68 Opportunistic behavior by a business partner suggests
an oppression action, rather than one for deadlock, is the optimal path to
choose, if for no other reason than it avoids heightened proof of corporate
injury.69
Cases of feigned deadlock, such as Callier and Smith-Shrader, illustrate
that Illinois courts are capable of making this distinction. Those cases also

61. See Frank v. Hadesman & Frank, Inc., 83 F.3d 158, 160 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Illinois
follows the widespread rule that an action for harm to the corporation must be brought in the
corporate name. When investors have been injured in common, they must continue to act
through their collective--the corporation.”).
62. See Small v. Sussman, 713 N.E.2d 1216, 1220 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (describing
diversion of business to other entity a “classic injury to the corporation”).
63. See Borgsmiller v. Burroughs, 542 N.E.2d 1281, 1286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)
(providing that shareholders may bring derivative suit only if they first demand that directors
bring action, unless they plead that “directors sought to be sued are in control of the corporation”).
64. Several courts analyze the concept of “oppression” with specific reference to prevailing fiduciary-duty rules that the corporation or the majority shareholders owe to a minority
partner. See Whale Art Co. v. Docter, 743 S.W.2d 511, 514 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Davis v.
Brockamp & Jaeger, Inc., 174 P.3d 607, 614 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
65. See In re Goodman v. Lovett, 607 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (stating
that underlying cause of deadlock “is of no moment, nor is it at all relevant to ascribe fault to
either party”).
66. See Donovan v. Quade, 830 F. Supp. 2d 460, 487-88 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
67. See Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 285 N.E.2d 574, 581 (Ill. App. Ct.
1972) (noting “oppression” is not synonymous with illegal or fraudulent activity and assessing
instead whether evidence showed “arbitrary, overbearing and heavy-handed course of conduct”).
68. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b)(10) (2017) (damages remedy); 805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/12.60(j) (2017) (legal fees available if party acts “arbitrarily, vexatiously, or otherwise
not in good faith”).
69. See infra text accompanying notes 74-100.
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stand for the broader principle that deadlock should be difficult for any shareholder to establish. Lax deadlock standards lead to more claims and incent
directors to act selfishly.70 Because principals of a closely-held corporation
have most of their investable assets tied up in their firm, they are more inclined to use aggressive tactics to protect their own interests.71 A rigorous
legal standard enables courts to ensure one director is not taking advantage
of another for the purposes of creating deadlock.72 The oppression standard
and even default fiduciary duty rules temper the deadlock analysis, providing
an aggrieved and innocent shareholder a different and easier path to equitable
relief.73
C.

The Injury Requirement: Irreparable Harm and Beyond

Deadlock and oppression claims differ for another equally significant
reason: the burden of proof is drastically higher when a shareholder brings a
deadlock action. A petitioning shareholder’s proof of pervasive internal
strife, by itself, is insufficient. That showing must further convince a court
that serious harm has resulted, or inevitably will result, to the shareholders
collectively or to the entity as a going concern.74
A garden-variety oppression complaint may have nothing to do with
harm to the corporation.75 By definition, it is an individualized claim.76 However, a deadlock case demands a rigorous analysis of corporate harm.77 The
BCA incorporates this standard by requiring a shareholder to prove either
irreparable injury or that the corporation cannot carry on its affairs to the
70. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency
Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 287 (1986) (discussing why directors should draft corporate
contracts to make dissolution more difficult to achieve).
71. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 229-30 (1991).
72. Id.
73. See Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316, 321-23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (analogizing fiduciary duties of major shareholders in closely-held corporation to those owed by
partners).
74. See Charles W. Murdock, Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 454
(1990) (discussing need to show harm to the corporation and its going-concern value under
“irreparable injury” prong).
75. See Cent. Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 141 N.E.2d 45, 51 (Ill. 1957) (rejecting
argument that oppression is synonymous with illegal or fraudulent and stating that “[m]isapplication of assets or mismanagement of funds are not, as we read the statute, indispensable
ingredients of ‘oppressive’ conduct.”).
76. Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 870 (Tex. 2014); N. Air Servs. v. Link, 804
N.W.2d 458, 478 (Wis. 2011).
77. TransPerfect Glob., Inc. v. Elting (In re Shawe & Elting, LLC), C.A. No. 9661CB, 2015 WL 4874733, at *26-30 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015), aff’d, 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017).
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general advantage of the shareholders.78 Under either prong, a court must
examine deadlock’s impact.79 A showing of injury to a particular shareholder
is not enough, though courts sometimes get it wrong.80
The most logical starting place for deciphering what constitutes irreparable injury is the standard for obtaining injunctive relief. Irreparable injury
does not mean harm beyond compensation in damages, but rather one that
denotes “transgressions of a continuing nature.”81 Courts frequently discuss
the concept of irreparable injury by assessing whether a legal remedy is adequate, often merging the two inquiries.82 A petitioning shareholder likely
could show irreparable injury if management deadlock has caused abnormal
customer attrition, a failure to renew a favorable supply contract, or the inability to protect valuable intellectual property rights.83 These intangible injuries could harm a firm’s competitive position, its going-concern value, or the
delivery of shareholder returns.84 A court also may find irreparable injury if
deadlock leads to the corporation’s inability to borrow money, refinance debt
obligations, or close the terms of a forbearance agreement.85
Some courts have looked beyond these particularized showings of harm
and instead have found irreparable injury when the directors are “unable to
cooperate in the management of the corporation’s business,” leaving the application of this general standard to the particular facts of the dispute.86 As
an illustration, a recent case from Delaware involving TransPerfect Global,

78. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 12.56(a)(1) (2017).
79. See Henry-George & Sons, Inc. v. Cooper-George, Inc., 632 P.2d 512, 516-17
(Wash. 1981) (interpreting dissolution statute to require more than jurisdictional facts establishing deadlock; court also must consider “seriousness of the deadlock and whether the corporation is able to conduct business profitably despite the deadlock.”).
80. See Gillingham v. Swan Falls Land & Cattle, Inc., 683 P.2d 895, 897 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1984) (focusing upon injury to shareholder, not entity).
81. Victor Twp. Drainage Dist. 1 v. Lundeen Family Farm P’ship, 19 N.E.3d 652,
666 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
82. See Fleet Wholesale Supply Co. v. Remington Arms Co., 846 F.2d 1095, 1098
(7th Cir. 1988) (“To say that [an] injury is irreparable means that the methods of repair (remedies at law) are inadequate.”); Hutter v. Lake View Tr. & Sav. Bank, 370 N.E.2d 47, 49 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1977) (“Irreparable harm is established where the remedy at law is inadequate in that
monetary damages either will not adequately compensate plaintiff or cannot be measured by
any pecuniary standard.”).
83. See, e.g., Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1323 (D. S.C. 1987) (identifying
potential for lost customers as a basis for finding that petitioner met deadlock standard under
South Carolina statute).
84. See Prentice Med. Corp. v. Todd, 495 N.E.2d 1044, 1051 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
(noting that the concept of irreparable harm contemplates damage to goodwill of a business or
loss of competitive position).
85. Skarbo v. Skarbo Scandinavian Furniture Imp., Inc., Nos. 54288-5-I, 54410-5-I,
2005 WL 1950599, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2005).
86. Goldstein v. Studley, 452 S.W.2d 75, 79-80 (Mo. 1970).
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In re Shawe & Elting, found management deadlock in a profitable corporation when the directors and co-Chief Executive Officers could not agree on
acquisition strategy, as well as hiring and retention of key employees.87
If a petitioning shareholder cannot show irreparable harm resulting from
management paralysis, she alternatively could illustrate the corporation is
unable to conduct business to the shareholders’ general advantage.88 This alternative form of proof stems from the 1984 Model Business Corporation
Act, which in theory expanded the bases upon which a shareholder could
establish a deadlock claim.89 Other states have adopted similar shareholdercentric language in their deadlock statutes.90 A shareholder can satisfy this
injury prong by demonstrating the deadlock has allowed one director to assume effective control of the company or sabotage the business, a Gidwitzstyle analysis.91 Courts in North Carolina interpret this provision to require a
showing “that the business is being conducted to the unfair advantage of one
shareholder or group of shareholders, or that a shareholder or group of shareholders is benefitting at the expense of the others.”92 The impact of deadlock
on shareholders’ ability to receive dividends also may establish that the corporation cannot provide for the shareholders’ general advantage. Because
shareholders in a closely-held corporation often rely on the firm for salarylike income, deadlock over distributions can undermine one of the primary
purposes of the enterprise.93
For many courts, the general-advantage language appears to demand a
showing that the enterprise is unprofitable.94 For instance, an old Minnesota
87. TransPerfect Glob., Inc. v. Elting (In re Shawe & Elting LLC), C.A. No. 9661CB, 2015 WL 4874733, at *26-30 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015), aff’d, 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017).
88. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(a)(1) (2017).
89. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30(2)(1) (1984).
90. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1430(B)(1) (2017) (establishing grounds
for judicial dissolution); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-300(2)(i) (2016) (same).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 48-73; see also Sartori v. S&S Trucking, Inc.,
139 P.3d 806, 809 (Mont. 2006).
92. Foster v. Foster Farms, Inc., 436 S.E.2d 843, 848-49 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); see
also Ellis v. Civic Improvement, Inc., 209 S.E.2d 873, 876 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974) (affirming
dissolution order when deadlock favored one shareholder over the others). The Supreme Court
of South Dakota applied the same analysis in the context of a deadlocked limited liability
company. See Kirksey v. Grohmann, 754 N.W.2d 825, 831 (S.D. 2008) (two of four LLC
members unfairly benefited from lease terms; remanding for entry of dissolution order).
93. TransPerfect Glob., Inc. v. Elting (In re Shawe & Elting LLC), C.A. No. 9661CB, 2015 WL 4874733, at *26 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015), aff’d, 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017).
94. See Vander Wall v. Burns, No. 91 C 4294, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13716, at *20
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1992) (stating that whether corporation can be conducted to general advantage of the shareholders “turns, primarily, on the profitability of the corporation.”); Enders
v. Enders, 991 N.E.2d 154, 159-60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (affirming decision to dissolve corporation in part because it was no longer profitable); Blythe v. Blythe, 870 P.2d 705, 707 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1994) (affirming decision not to dissolve ranching operation where equal shareholders had “mere disputes” over profitable business).
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deadlock case says the term advantage “connotes elements of opportunity,
benefit, or profit, and negatively suggests absence of sacrifice, harm or
loss.”95 This reasoning suggests shareholders could make a convincing case
that the business operates to no one’s general advantage if management discord leads to the accumulation of continual operating losses.96
The BCA implicitly endorses a more flexible standard, since it provides
that a court may not refuse to dissolve a corporation “solely because it has
accumulated earnings or current operating profits.”97 This statutory language
softens the general-advantage test used by other courts and enables a petitioning shareholder to meet her burden of proof in ways that are divorced
from a profitability analysis. On this score, a petitioning shareholder should
be able to argue credibly for relief (including the disfavored remedy of dissolution98) by illustrating that the court should impose a remedy before pervasive harm to the entity and the shareholders ensues, provided the prospective harm is factually grounded and not merely speculative. As the Court of
Appeals of Kansas has stated, removing the dissolution remedy from the
profitable but deadlocked enterprise “would ignore many other potential and
serious harms, like lost profits, lost business opportunities, or the failure to
realize other common expectations that may have been part of the company’s
business plan before the deadlock.”99 One leading commentator seems to
agree that the deadlock question should not hinge on mere corporate solvency.100
III. THE REMEDIAL LIMITATIONS OF SECTION 12.56
Assuming a petitioning shareholder can establish deadlock, the question
turns to the appropriate remedy. Some of the remedies available to shareholders under section 12.56 are exceedingly narrow.101 Others are broad and

95. Anderson v. Anderson (In re Lakeland Dev. Corp.), 152 N.W.2d 758, 767 (Minn.
1967).
96. This approach is consistent with partnership law, which generally recognizes that
courts may dissolve partnerships if they only can be continued at a loss. See 805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 206/801(5)(i) (2017); Mandell v. Centrum Frontier Corp., 407 N.E.2d 821, 828-29 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1980).
97. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b)(12) (2017).
98. See infra text accompanying notes 152-67.
99. In re Metcalf Assocs.-2000, LLC, 213 P.3d 751, 755 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009).
100. See Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a
Remedy for Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25, 34 (1987).
101. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b)(1, 5, 8-10) (2017).
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sweeping, empowering a court to realign corporate management and ownership.102 One potential remedy available to petitioning shareholders is judicial
dissolution: a court-ordered termination of the company as a legal entity.103
By its very text, section 12.56(b)(12) openly discourages involuntary
dissolution. The statute allows for dissolution only if the “court determines
that no remedy specified in subdivisions (1) through (11) or other alternative
remedy is sufficient to resolve the matters in dispute.”104 This is consistent
with the common-law admonition that dissolution is a remedy of last resort.105 Other states have similar, though inexact, statutory admonitions concerning the dissolution remedy.106
A.

Section 12.56(b): An Overview

To gauge the viability of the dissolution remedy, subsection (12) requires a deep analysis of the various alternative forms of relief in a shareholder action. Some of the BCA’s enumerated remedies may apply to deadlock claims, while others plainly do not. Section 12.56’s list of remedies,
short of dissolution, includes the following:
(1) The performance, prohibition, alteration, or setting aside of any action of the corporation or of its
shareholders, directors, or officers of or any other
party to the proceedings;
(2) The cancellation or alteration of any provision
in the corporation’s articles of incorporation or bylaws;
(3) The removal from office of any director or officer;
(4) The appointment of any individual as a director
or officer;
(5) An accounting with respect to any matter in dispute;
(6) The appointment of a custodian to manage the
business and affairs of the corporation to serve for
the term and under the conditions prescribed by the
court;
102. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b)(2-4, 6-7) (2017).
103. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b)(12) (2017).
104. Id.
105. Schirmer v. Bear, 672 N.E.2d 1171, 1176 (Ill. 1996).
106. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (2017) (stating court “shall consider whether lesser
relief” would be “adequate”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-939 (2015) (enabling the court to
order relief other than dissolution if, in its discretion, such other relief would be “appropriate”;
listing non-exclusive alternative remedies, including purchase of any shareholder’s equity at
fair value).
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(7) The appointment of a provisional director to
serve for the term and under the conditions prescribed by the court;
(8) The submission of the dispute to mediation or
other forms of non-binding alternative dispute resolution;
(9) The payment of dividends;
(10) The award of damages to any aggrieved party;
(11) The purchase by the corporation of one or more
other shareholders of all, but not less than all, of the
shares of the petitioning shareholder for their fair
value and on the terms determined under subsection
(e)….107
The remedies contained in subsections (1), (5), (9), and (10) are simply
not applicable to, or are not at all sufficient to resolve, claims of director
deadlock. Instead, they are more suited to actions for corporate waste or minority shareholder oppression, the other substantive branches of section
12.56.108 Subsection (8), authorizing a court to submit a dispute to non-binding mediation, is less of a unique shareholder remedy and rather a reflection
of existing judicial authority. Many Illinois circuit courts already have mandatory mediation programs, which include actions filed in chancery court.109
Despite the fulsome list of remedies courts may consider, only two categories
other than dissolution potentially would be appropriate to resolve deadlock
claims. Those categories, discussed in the following two sections, concern
court-ordered director or custodial appointments and share buy-outs.
B.

Section 12.56(b) and Managerial Appointments

Subsections (2), (3), (4), (6), and (7) all contemplate a change in director
composition or director function, which in theory could break an impasse
between the incumbent, warring directors. Two of these potential remedies
contain obvious limitations. A bylaw change to require an odd number of
directors (subsection (2)) assumes the shareholders will agree on who should
serve. That assumption seems inconsistent with what brought the parties to
court in the first place. And, the removal of a director (subsection (3)) only
107. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b)(1)-(11) (2017).
108. See, e.g., Bone v. Coyle Mech. Supply, Inc., No. 5-15-0117, 2017 WL 2403268,
at *16 (Ill. App. Ct. June 1, 2017) (affirming in part and vacating in part remedies afforded
plaintiffs, including damages, for claim of shareholder oppression).
109. See ILL. 18TH JUD. CIR. CT. R. 14.02 (all chancery actions eligible for court-ordered mediation).
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provides a temporary solution, since the shareholder who has her director
removed (assuming they are not the same person) almost certainly will anoint
a figurehead who is just as likely to perpetuate the deadlock.
The remedies provided for in subsections (4), (6), and (7) require a more
nuanced analysis to determine their suitability to deadlock claims. Subsection
(4) allows a court to appoint a director,110 while subsections (6) and (7) authorize custodians and provisional directors “to serve for the term.”111 On its
face, each subsection seems to solve the deadlock problem. But the appointment of a director or custodian injects the court into a continuing supervisory
role over the corporation.112 Not only does a judicial appointment create
added transaction costs, but it also may prolong a dispute that requires prompt
resolution.113 Just as significantly, court-ordered director appointments undermine the shareholders’ ex ante decision to retain full veto authority over
the management of the business.114 The choice among shareholders to retain
this veto right (either by virtue of their status as equal shareholders or due to
super-majority voting provisions) is not a notional one.115 Instead, it is implicit in the construction of their planning documents. Court-ordered director
and custodial appointments undermine that choice.
Director-appointment remedies also are riddled with practical problems.
Illinois law permits a director to resign at any time, meaning even a plenary
appointment under subsection (4) is, by definition, tenuous.116 The provisional-director remedy (subsection (7)) is particularly problematic because
such an appointment renders the chosen director “an officer of the court.”117
The same language appears in subsection (6) with regard to appointed “custodians,” which means courts are sure to vest them with officer status too.118

110. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b)(4) (2017).
111. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b)(6)-(7) (2017).
112. See TransPerfect Glob., Inc. v. Elting (In re Shawe & Elting LLC), C.A. No.
9661-CB, 2015 WL 4874733, at *26 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015) (noting option under section
226 of Delaware General Corporation Law to appoint “custodian to serve as a third director
or some form of tie-breaking mechanism in the governance of the Company” but rejecting it
as unwieldy), aff’d, 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017).
113. See Susanna M. Kim, The Provisional Director Remedy for Corporate Deadlock:
A Proposed Model Statute, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 137-44 (2003).
114. Id. at 138, 142.
115. See Israels, supra note 13, at 793.
116. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.10(g) (2017) (“A director may resign at any time by
giving written notice to the board of directors, its chairman, or to the president or secretary of
the corporation.”). Standard bylaws frequently parrot this language.
117. Abreu ex rel. Ebro Foods v. Unica Indus. Sales, Inc., 586 N.E.2d 661, 667 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991).
118. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b)(6) (2017).
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Despite receiving this quasi-judicial status, a provisional director or custodian does not have to be impartial.119 Illinois law is also silent on whether
provisional directors or custodians owe fiduciary duties to the corporation,
are vested with the same powers as conventionally-elected directors, or are
able to avail themselves of the business-judgment rule.
Given this uncertainty, counsel should assume the role of a provisional
director or custodian is strictly circumscribed by the court, particularly given
other states’ laws that suggest a role more sweeping in scope.120 Furthermore,
provisional-director and custodial appointments only can extend “for the
term,” implying a temporally limited role designed to break a deadlock on
imminent managerial decisions affecting a limited class of subjects.121 To
that end, any appointment would invite another round of remedial choices
and even more judicial oversight into the corporation’s ongoing affairs.
One specific point on custodian appointments is worth mentioning. By
its plain language, subsection (6) does not contemplate that a custodian has
any authority to sell or auction off the business. Rather, the custodian provision allows a court-appointed officer to “manage the business and affairs of
the corporation.”122 This remedial language is different and more restrictive
than section 226 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which authorizes
custodial appointments in the face of deadlock.123 Under Delaware law, a
custodian must “continue the business of the corporation,” but section 226(b)
allows a court to “otherwise order” the scope of the custodian’s powers.124
Delaware courts have interpreted section 226 to allow custodians to sell the
deadlocked firm as a going-concern in “unusual” cases.125 Textually, the custodial remedy in section 12.56 is narrower and does not suggest that the
power extends to auctioning off the business.126 A long-term solution, rather
119. Abreu, 586 N.E.2d at 665. Contra ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.640(b) (2016) (requiring impartial provisional director).
120. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 180.1833(2)(a)(7) (2017) (for statutory close corporation,
stating that a provisional director shall have “all of the rights, powers and duties of a duly
elected director . . .”).
121. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b)(6)-(7) (2017).
122. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b)(6) (2017).
123. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 226(a)-(b) (2016).
124. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 226(b) (2016).
125. See, e.g., TransPerfect Glob., Inc. v. Elting (In re Shawe & Elting LLC), C.A.
No. 9661-CB, 2015 WL 4874733, at *32 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015) (ordering custodian to
report on viability of sale limited to two existing owners of deadlocked corporation, or some
other process including an “open auction”), aff’d, 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017); Bentas v.
Haseotes, No. Civ.A. 17223 NC, 2003 WL 1711856, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2003) (granting
motion to auction business in deadlock case).
126. One potential exception is the Court’s ability to award “other legal and equitable
remedies which the court may impose.” 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(c) (2017). No reported
case discusses the possibility of a court-ordered sale or just what types of remedies this statutory provision may allow. However, the share-purchase remedy, discussed at length below,
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than interim, court-appointed tie-breakers, is what a deadlocked firm
needs.127
Even if a court considers a director or custodial appointment a viable
solution for deadlock, it would need to identify a qualified third-party and
then gauge that individual’s interest in serving a corporation with management embroiled in litigation.128 Courts naturally should be reluctant to inject
a third-party into this combustible situation involuntarily.129 Above all, the
procedural remedies in subsections (4), (6), and (7) are unlikely to cure a
deadlocked firm. Just as critically, none of those remedies are consistent with
the principle that shareholders should be given the freedom to arrange their
contractual affairs as they see fit—even if those arrangements are incomplete,
misguided, and designed to foster deadlock.130
That leaves subsection (11) and the possibility of a court-ordered buyout of the petitioner’s equity. That remedy, though, is fraught with procedural
and decisional complexity.
C.

Section 12.56 and the Share-Purchase Remedy

A buy-out of a petitioning shareholder would seem to resolve deadlock
and foster corporate continuity.131 Upon a finding that the directors are paralyzed in a firm’s management, a court necessarily must determine that those
directors are incapable of working together for the betterment of the corporation as a whole.132 Just as significantly, this finding means the corporation’s
expected going-concern value will decrease if the two directors are forced to
remain together indefinitely; the injury prong of a section 12.56(a)(1) claim
appears to limit the auction remedy since no court can force a petitioner to sell her shares. See
infra text accompanying notes 134-49.
127. See Kim, supra note 113, at 136 (“If the parties have become completely incompatible, the appointment of a provisional director may be futile and may only delay the inevitable break-up of the company.”).
128. See Abreu ex rel. Ebro Foods v. Unica Indus. Sales, Inc., 586 N.E.2d 661, 665
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (listing, without citation to any authority, particular qualifications that trial
court “may balance in evaluating candidates for provisional director”).
129. See In re O’Brien Mach., Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 782, 784 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964)
(noting provisional director petitioned court to be relieved after one year in office because he
was “frustrated by his inability to effect a termination of the dissension”).
130. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Closely Held Firm: A View from the United States, 19
MELB. U. L. REV. 950, 955 (1994) (“[J]udicially-administered remedies threaten the security
of the agreements the parties have made”).
131. See Bruce C. Young & Hugh H. Makens, War and Pieces: The Impact of Deadlock in the Michigan Closely Held Corporation, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1863 (1996) (stating that
the “most obvious solution to deadlock is a buyout”). The Delaware General Corporation Law
takes a different approach, allowing courts to use its custodial power under section 226 to
foster a sale of the business as a going-concern. See supra text accompanying notes 122-26.
132. See, e.g., Donovan v. Quade, 830 F. Supp. 2d 460, 487-88 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
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demands such a finding by the court.133 Although a buy-out may be the logical means to resolve a deadlock between owner-operators of a closely-held
firm, Illinois law limits that remedy more than many would like to believe.
1. The Share-Purchase Remedy’s (Short) History
The share-purchase remedy in subsection (11) is somewhat new, as
shareholders in closely-held corporations did not have the option to ask a
court to order buy-out relief until 1995.134 Facilitating the sale of a petitioning
shareholder’s equity is a remedy that is now a common feature of other state
corporation statutes, though the grounds for obtaining a buy-out are hardly
uniform.135 Even without an express legislative grant of authority, some
courts were ordering this relief on pure equitable grounds.136
As it currently stands, section 12.56(f) governs the specific procedure
associated with the purchase of a petitioning party’s stock in a closely-held
corporation. It provides:
When the relief requested by the petition includes
the purchase of the petitioner’s shares, then at any
time within 90 days after the filing of the petition
under this Section, or at such time determined by the
court to be equitable, the corporation or one or more
shareholders may elect to purchase all, but not less
than all, of the shares owned by the petitioning
shareholder for their fair value.137
The General Assembly amended the BCA in 2005 to add the italicized
language concerning buy-out relief.138 By its plain language, section 12.56
does not allow a defendant to force a buy-out of the petitioning party’s shares
133. See Murdock, supra note 74, at 454.
134. See William R. Quinlan & John F. Kennedy, The Rights and Remedies of Shareholders in Closely Held Corporations Under Illinois Law, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 585, 607-12
(1998) (discussing history of General Assembly’s amendments to Business Corporation Act
of 1983, resulting in enactment of section 12.56).
135. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1489 (2016) (allowing court to order purchase
of shares at fair value if petitioner establishes oppression); MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (Subd. 2)
(2017) (authorizing purchase of shares if petitioner establishes deadlock, waste, or oppression).
136. See Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 269, 274-75 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) (in oppression and waste suit, relying on Oregon case of Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507
P.2d 387 (Or. 1973), to find that trial court could order a “partial liquidation and redemption
of the plaintiffs’ shares”).
137. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(f) (2017) (emphasis added).
138. Business Corporation Act of 1983, Pub. Act 94-394, 2005 Ill. Laws 394 (codified
as amended at 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12.56).
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unless the petitioner asks for it first.139 This confirms Illinois’ reputation as
a pro-shareholder state.140
The law before 2005 discouraged a shareholder with a legitimate complaint from seeking judicial remedies. The unfettered ability of the responding shareholder to purchase the petitioner’s shares, even if that shareholder
intended to remain involved with the corporation, incentivized self-dealing.
Put another way, if the responding shareholder (assume he truly is a wrongdoer) determined that the cost of violating his fiduciary duty was less than
the expected gain from buying out his partner, then section 12.56 enabled
that shareholder to obtain a windfall from his wrongful behavior. As long as
the responding party acted within ninety days of the petitioner’s lawsuit, he
had a call right on his partner’s equity interest—even if that partner did not
want to sell. The share-purchase remedy, as it existed for nearly a decade,
was structurally deficient, which may account for the low volume of reported
section 12.56 cases.
2. The Share-Purchase Remedy and Its Perceived Ambiguity
Some commentators have suggested, in voicing their displeasure with
the 2005 amendments to section 12.56, that an involuntary buy-out of a petitioning shareholder still may be available.141 This idea springs from the enabling language in subsection (11) that a court may order “[t]he purchase by
the corporation or one or more other shareholders of all, but not less than all,
of the shares of the petitioning shareholder for their fair value . . . .”142 Under
this theory, a plenary grant of authority under subsection (11) means that a
corporation or shareholder group can call a petitioner’s shares, even if she
does not want to sell.
No court has addressed this argument—at least not directly. Witters v.
Hicks is the only Illinois case that comes close to doing so.143 In the defendant’s first appeal, the appellate court examined his effort to buy out the petitioning party’s shares.144 The buy-out remedy was not available to Hicks because he missed the ninety-day election deadline under section 12.56(f).145
139. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(f) (2017)
140. Charles W. Murdock, Squeeze-Outs, Freeze-Outs, and Discounts: Why is Illinois
in the Minority in Protecting Shareholder Interests?, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 737, 737 (2004).
141. See Lynn A. Ellenberger, The Illinois Legislature Overcorrected Section 12.56(f)
of the Illinois Business Corporation Act’s Forced Buy-Out Provision for Close Corporations,
COUNSELOR (Ill. State Bar. Ass’n Section on Bus. Advice & Fin. Planning Newsletter, Springfield, Ill.), Feb. 2008.
142. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b)(11) (2017).
143. Witters v. Hicks, 780 N.E.2d 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
144. Id. at 721-23.
145. Id. at 722.
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The reasoning suggests a narrow reading of the share-purchase remedy. Importantly, since Witters v. Hicks, the General Assembly made it more favorable to petitioning shareholders. In this respect, a defendant still must make
the election promptly—that is, within the same ninety-day window from the
case-filing date—and may do so only if the petitioner asks in her complaint
to be bought out.146 In effect, the General Assembly has made a clear and
deliberate policy choice to place control of the buy-out remedy firmly in the
petitioning shareholder’s hands. Adopting the position that section
12.56(b)(11) allows for an involuntary share-purchase would reverse this
policy choice and render section 12.56(f) meaningless.
It would be incongruous and absurd to read section 12.56 as allowing a
truly involuntary, forced purchase of equity when subsection (f) contains detailed procedural requirements to enhance protections for the petitioning
party.147 To harmonize the statute, which is a patchwork of legislative amendments, section 12.56(b)(11) reasonably can be read to include a properly requested buy-out remedy by the petitioning shareholder as the appropriate relief a “court may order” once she proves a substantive claim under section
(a). It goes no further.
A court hearing a section 12.56 case, therefore, cannot force a shareholder to sell her shares, unless she asks to be bought-out, or unless she
agrees to be bought-out in the corporate planning documents upon the filing
of a dissolution action. This feature of section 12.56 is by no means uniform
when measured against similar statutes or rules in other states.148 For instance, the California Corporations Code enables the non-petitioning shareholders to avoid dissolution by purchasing the petitioner’s equity at fair
value.149 Section 12.56 could be clearer; however, when considering its entire
statutory structure, the buy-out remedy is quite limited. Its availability rests
entirely in the hands of the party seeking relief.
With the amendments to the buy-out remedy, the General Assembly
placed great weight on shareholder autonomy. That legislative judgment further suggests that director and custodial appointments under subsections (4),
146. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(f) (2017).
147. See Solon v. Midwest Med. Records Ass’n, 925 N.E.2d 1113, 1117-18 (Ill. 2010)
(stating that courts may consider consequences from construing a statute and in so doing may
presume the General Assembly did not intend “absurd, inconvenient, or unjust consequences”).
148. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-939 (2015) (allowing judge to award relief
other than dissolution on any grounds “it considers appropriate,” with such relief to include
the purchase of any shareholder’s equity at fair value); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383,
389 (N.D. 1987) (holding trial court abused its discretion in ordering dissolution; instructing
court to require corporation or other shareholders to purchase minority interest at fair value).
149. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000 (Deering 2017). Other states have similar procedures.
See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:14.34(a) (2017); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.2-1315
(2017).
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(6), and (7) ought to be used sparingly in an equally-split firm; as such, an
appointment is inconsistent with the shareholders’ ability to retain full veto
authority over the firm’s management. So despite the range of potential remedies, none is a perfect fit for a deadlock claim—at least when the petitioning
shareholder does not ask for the other shareholders to buy her out. The careful
construction of the buy-out remedy forces a more in-depth analysis of dissolution as a default means to resolve deadlock.
IV. DECONSTRUCTING THE MODEL: DISSOLUTION AS A DRASTIC REMEDY
Subsection (12), the cautionary provision that allows a court to order
dissolution only if no other remedy is sufficient,150 finds roots in the common
law. The general rule states that “[c]orporate dissolution is a drastic remedy
that must not be lightly invoked.”151 Viewing this black-letter principle in a
vacuum, it is easy to discount dissolution as a viable equitable remedy in a
section 12.56 suit. However, the drastic-remedy principle has devolved from
three separate and independent sources, none of which is compelling enough
to discount the viability of dissolution as a presumptively available remedy
in the deadlocked corporation.
A.

The Common Law of Dissolution

The first source comes from the interplay of related common-law principles. Long before the BCA was enacted, the Supreme Court of Illinois announced in Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co. that “[i]n the absence of
statutory authority, courts of chancery had no jurisdiction to decree a dissolution of a corporation by declaring a forfeiture of its franchise, either at the
suit of an individual or of the state.”152 Because courts construe statutes in
derogation of the common law narrowly,153 legislation authorizing a chancery court to dissolve and liquidate a business led courts to view dissolution
with skepticism. The Pullman rule stems from the “concession theory” of
corporate law and has no relevance today.154 On this score, one commentator
150. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b)(12) (2017).
151. Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131, 138 (Ill. 1960); see also
Cent. Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 141 N.E.2d 45, 51 (Ill. 1957).
152. Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 32 N.E. 420, 421 (Ill. 1892). This rule was
by no means uniform at the time. The same year that the Supreme Court of Illinois decided
Wheeler, the Michigan Supreme Court held in Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co. that a court of equity
could wind up a solvent corporation when it “utterly failed of its purpose, not because of matters beyond its control, but because of fraudulent mismanagement and misappropriation of its
funds.” Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 53 N.W. 218, 224 (Mich. 1892).
153. Summers v. Summers, 239 N.E.2d 795, 798 (Ill. 1968).
154. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 205-12
(1990) (discussing public law view of corporations prevalent in 19th century).
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has noted that “corporate statutes are not some legislative hoop through
which one must jump in order to be endowed by the legislature with the privilege of doing business in the corporate form; rather they are an attempt to
provide a format in which business can prosper, pay taxes, and employ voters.”155 The corporate form has evolved and matured to the point where the
observance of formalities is less important than it used to be.156
B.

Remedial Imbalance and Proportionality

The drastic-remedy principle further developed when courts lacked the
authority to award any other remedies for petitioning shareholders except dissolution.157 Courts addressed all shareholder claims in conjunction with the
dissolution remedy—precisely because no other remedy was available.158
The current version of section 12.56, last amended in 2005, includes eleven
other equitable remedies, some of which amount to a wholesale judicial reordering of management and ownership.159 Even those remedies do nothing
to limit a judge’s discretion in shareholder disputes. If a court is so inclined,
it can implement any other legal or equitable remedy sufficient to resolve the
matters in dispute—whether or not it is listed under section 12.56.160
The current availability of multiple remedies to remediate shareholder
oppression, director deadlock, and corporate waste, cuts both ways when examining whether dissolution is truly “drastic.” For starters, dissolution is
plainly inappropriate in some cases. Consider a classic fact matrix involving
a minority shareholder who pleads oppression. The majority, seeking to
freeze-out a minority partner, authorizes excessive officer salaries and declines to pay dividends to the shareholders.161 Subsection (9) enables a court,
when faced with an oppression suit under these facts, to award payment of
155. See Murdock, supra note 74, at 441.
156. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/10-10(c) (2017) (stating that in Illinois limited liability company, the failure to “observe the usual company formalities or requirements relating to the exercise of its company powers or management of its business is not a ground for
imposing personal liability on the members of managers for liabilities of the company”).
157. ILL. REV. STAT. 1955, chap. 32, par. 157.86(a). The Illinois Business Corporation
Act of 1983, which went into effect July 1, 1984, replaced the Business Corporation Act of
1933. As one commentator describes, the 1983 Act replaced as much as eighty percent of the
1933 Act. James M. Van Vliet, Jr., The New Illinois Business Corporation Act Needs More
Work, 61 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 3 (1985).
158. See Cent. Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 141 N.E.2d 45, 50-51 (Ill. 1957) (analyzing oppression facts in light of request for corporate liquidation).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 107-30.
160. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(c) (2017).
161. See, e.g., Rexford Rand Corp. v. Ancel, 58 F.3d 1215, 1227 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995)
(discussing concept of minority shareholder “freeze-out”); Miller v. Magline, Inc., 256
N.W.2d 761 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
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dividends to the complaining shareholder.162 It may also require the corporation to set aside any corporate act under subsection (1) so that it can pay those
dividends without jeopardizing cash flow.163 And of course, many aggrieved
minority shareholders would want to sell their equity when confronted with
oppressive conditions.
Under these facts, a request for dissolution would be wholly disproportionate to the significant, though individualized, harm the minority shareholder incurred. Neither the shareholders nor the court could justify disrupting an entire going-concern enterprise when a lesser remedy specific to a
particular shareholder is enough to cure the complained-of conduct, even if
that conduct borders on malfeasance. In this sense, courts may properly consider dissolution to be a “drastic” remedy. But in a practical sense, the shareholders cannot seek the remedy regardless because it would be wholly disproportionate to the claimed injury.164

162. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b)(9) (2017).
163. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b)(1) (2017).
164. See Kalabogias v. Georgou, 627 N.E.2d 51, 54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (in shareholder
oppression case, noting both sides sought share-purchase remedy in lieu of dissolution);
Hockenberger v. Curry, 215 N.W.2d 627, 628 (Neb. 1974) (noting “drastic” remedy of liquidation “must be invoked with extreme caution,” but so noting in context of minority shareholder oppression). Claims of corporate waste also suggest remedies short of dissolution. Minority shareholders often bring litigation when those in control of the corporation misapply
firm assets or divert them for personal use, such as to pay for life insurance, legal fees, or to
fund an affiliate entity. See, e.g., Williams v. Fugett, No. 3-13-0834, 2014 WL 4439631, at
*5-6 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 9, 2014). The specter of corporate waste may lead a court to order an
accounting of any disputed transfers under subsection (5) and even the appointment of a custodian to manage the corporation’s affairs under subsection (6). Dissolution under this factpattern again would lack proportionality to the merits, since lesser remedies would redress the
particularized harm pled by a petitioning shareholder.
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Put differently, the remedial scheme embodied within section 12.56
contains an implicit proportionality requirement. The statute is flexible
enough to address myriad shareholder disputes, ranging from ones where
harm is discrete and individualized to those in which it is crippling and pervasive. To be sure, dissolution is indeed drastic, but only when viewed
against the particular facts and the availability of other remedies to accomplish a complaining shareholder’s objective. Cases of director deadlock merit
special treatment, though. A court first must find injurious management paralysis or a complete defeat of the corporate purpose before even considering
what remedy to impose.165 The universe of sufficient remedies, therefore,
narrows significantly. Targeted, surgical action is simply not sufficient to
cure deadlock.166
C.

The Specter of Minority Opportunism

Corporations span a broad structural continuum. On the one hand, they
can resemble partnerships, where a small group of owners also retains active
management rights. Conversely, many corporations are decentralized and
even look like publicly-traded firms. In this latter class, minority shareholders may play no active role in the firm’s management. Liberal dissolution
rights for this archetypal corporation would vest too much control in passive
entity participants and give rise to the potential for opportunism by a minority
shareholder to wrest away entity control from the majority.167
The drastic-remedy principle counterbalances the potential for opportunism that liberal dissolution rights may create when placed in the hands of
minority shareholders. In many respects, the concern for opportunism is a
reflection of the remedial imbalance that often attended shareholder disputes.
But as the very text of section 12.56 illustrates, that imbalance no longer exists. And in cases involving corporations that, at the margins, simulate equal
partnerships, concerns about minority opportunism vanish. In these corporations, the retention of management veto authority militates against the risk of
pure opportunistic behavior.

165. See supra text accompanying notes 74-100; See also Callier v. Callier, 378
N.E.2d 405, 408 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (stating deadlock must be of “such serious proportions
as to defeat the end for which the corporation is organized”).
166. See Israels, supra note 13, at 793 (“[I]t seems clear to the writer that a simple and
flexible remedy for deadlock or stalemate must be provided, and that the untouchability of the
sacred cow must not be permitted to impede its exercise.”).
167. See Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A
Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 239-41 (1992) (discussing reasons why
investors choose particular types of entities).
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V.EXTERNAL DISSOLUTION CONSIDERATIONS
Remedies for deadlock are highly dependent on decisions shareholders
make when they form their enterprise. Shareholders can, and sometimes do,
deal with deadlock in their planning documents.168 Deadlock avoidance
mechanisms may be found in corporate bylaws,169 but they also are appropriate to include in shareholder agreements.170 Although new business partners
may not be inclined to plan for an acrimonious separation, advance contract
planning helps establish their expectations and reduces uncertainty associated with litigating deadlock claims.
Planning, though, has its inherent limitations. Nobel laureate Herbert A.
Simon espoused a theory of “bounded rationality,” in which he stated that
individuals’ capacity to undertake a particular course of action is bounded by
“cognitive limits.”171 That is, Simon believed individuals have a limited ability to assimilate all available information necessary to make a decision.172
They, therefore, resort to something acceptable, instead of what is optimal.173
The behavioral model of bounded rationality applies with great force to business owners’ initial planning, such as the relative distaste for dickering over
corporate bylaws and shareholder agreements.174 Given the consequences
and the investments shareholders make in their own enterprise, one would
think just the opposite.175

168. See Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial
Resolution of Business Deadlock, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 204 (2014).
169. A corporation’s bylaws constitute a contract defining the rights and duties of the
corporation and its shareholders with respect to each other. Teschner v. Chi. Title & Tr. Co.,
322 N.E.2d 54, 57 (Ill. 1974).
170. The BCA enables corporations to use shareholder agreements for a wide range of
purposes. Section 7.71 provides that a shareholder agreement is not invalid on the basis that it
“so relates to the conduct of the affairs of the corporation as to interfere with the discretion of
the board of directors.” 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.71(c) (2017).
171. Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, in MODELS OF MAN,
SOCIAL AND RATIONAL: MATHEMATICAL ESSAYS ON RATIONAL HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIAL
SETTING 99 (1957).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Noam Wassermann & Thomas Hellmann, The Very First Mistake Most
Startup Founders Make, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 23, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/02/the-veryfirst-mistake-most-startup-founders-make [https://perma.cc/8WMC-EZ8W] (stating that
founders prioritize operational decisions above “how to structure their own founding teams”).
175. See Brent Beshore, Why Small Businesses Are Feeling an Economic Crunch,
FORBES (Oct. 11, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brentbeshore/2015/10/11/thesmall-business-crunch/#74125b7c5dc7 [https://perma.cc/JU3U-SB4V] (noting many “business owners have 80% or more of their personal assets tied up in their businesses”).
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Deadlock Avoidance Mechanisms

Co-venturers, of course, remain free to choose among a variety of contractual clauses that avoid deadlock.176 Generally, these deadlock avoidance
mechanisms take two forms: (1) tie-breakers; and (2) buy-sell provisions.
Tie-breaker clauses are easy to draft and conceptually simple to understand. But, they have limitations. Typically, a tie-breaker provision will call
upon a specific person to break management deadlock. The tie-breaker is
sometimes the board chairperson or a third-party. Locating an independent
tie-breaker may be an arduous task, for few likely are willing to undertake
this endeavor.177 A tie-breaker appointee also may worry about the perception that he is colluding with an existing shareholder faction. And an outsider
who is not familiar with the day-to-day business of the corporation may fear
liability from making a key business judgment–or may not understand
enough to make that judgment in the first place.
Other tie-breaking clauses may call for the directors to take alternating
turns casting the decisive vote. Internal tie-breaking mechanisms, though, are
inconsistent with the purpose of an equally-divided firm. Owners expect to
have an equal say in management, which corresponds to an unfettered veto
right–regardless of whether that right ultimately proves to be judicious. Just
as problematically, alternating tie-breaker systems between directors (or
among director groups) can encourage them to game the system and feign
deadlock over secondary issues in the hopes of gaining a deciding vote on
more critical ones.
Other deadlock avoidance mechanisms resemble buy-sell arrangements. The Arizona Court of Appeals in Gries v. Plaza Del Rio Mgmt.
Corp.178 discussed one common mechanism, a “shotgun” provision, and said
that it:
allows one party to set the purchasing price of other
party’s shares, and the other party the option of buying or selling the shares at that price. If the first party
sets the share price below its fair value, that party
risks the other party buying the shares too cheaply.
If the first party sets the price above fair value, that
party risks the other party selling the shares at an inflated price.179
176. See Kerry M. Lavelle, Drafting Shareholder Agreements for the Closely-Held
Business, 4 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 109, 127 (1991).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
178. Gries v. Plaza Del Rio Mgmt. Corp., 335 P.3d 530 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
179. Id. at 535-36.
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In Gries, the court affirmed a decision to halt the dissolution proceedings filed by one shareholder, relying on the built-in fairness of the shotgun
provision to yield an equitable outcome.180
Shareholders could also agree in their planning documents that if any of
them files an action for dissolution, the corporation will commission a fairvalue opinion, at which point the petitioning shareholder must sell according
to the price returned. As Gries illustrates, courts welcome this sort of ex ante
planning—particularly given that it seems to promote a logical, ordered departure mechanism for one who no longer wishes to remain in the closelyheld firm.181 However phrased, a buy-sell mechanism has the benefit of fostering continuity, avoiding litigation, and incentivizing director-shareholders
to act in good faith.
The availability of contractual mechanisms designed to avoid deadlock
raises an intuitive question related to the contract at issue in Gries: Can shareholders waive the right to seek judicial dissolution? Not surprisingly, the
question rarely arises in litigation. One case that strictly enforced the parties’
waiver clause is R&R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC,
in which members of a limited liability company agreed to waive any judicial
dissolution rights they had.182 The Delaware Court of Chancery held that such
a provision indeed barred a dissolution proceeding, since it did not contravene the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act and was not against public policy.183 The court further noted that the members had “legitimate business reasons” for wanting to waive judicial dissolution rights in advance, not
the least of which was the risk that such an action could constitute a “noncurable event of default” in a credit facility.184
On the other hand, the Appellate Court of Connecticut held in Chance
v. Norwalk Fast Oil, Inc. that a shareholder agreement’s tie-breaking provision did not provide a jurisdictional defense to a dissolution suit.185 The parties’ stalemate clause required them to submit matters to an unidentified

180. Id. at 534-36.
181. See Kirksey v. Grohmann, 754 N.W.2d 825, 831 (S.D. 2008) (noting that in dissolution of LLC, “[n]o procedure exists in the company’s documentation to break a tie vote
[among members] and protect the company in the event of changed conditions”).
182. R&R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC, 2008
WL 3846318, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008).
183. Id. at *6-7.
184. Id. at *7. Subsequent decisions have disagreed with R&R Capital, noting that
2013 legislative amendments may have undercut the case’s reasoning. In re Carlisle Etcetera,
LLC, 114 A.3d 592, 605 (Del. Ch. 2015). That said, courts should enforce any sort of waiver
mechanism upon which members of an LLC agree. LLCs are an “uncorporate” form, which
give primacy to founders’ contractual rights (as long as those rights do not prejudice creditors).
See generally Larry E. Ribstein, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010).
185. Chance v. Norwalk Fast Oil, Inc., 739 A.2d 1275, 1279-80 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
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third-person, on whom the warring directors presumably had to agree to appoint as the tie-breaker. 186 Given the parties’ years of animosity and failure
to speak or hold meetings, the court found that the trial court “properly
stepped in to break the stalemate by dissolving the corporation.”187 In so
holding, the court rejected the argument that the petitioning shareholder
waived the right to seek judicial dissolution, instead stating that the defendants “have pointed to no language in the shareholder agreement that provides
unequivocally that any stockholder agreed to waive his right to seek a dissolution . . . .”188 Therefore, it is unclear whether the Appellate Court of Connecticut would have enforced a complete waiver provision similar to that at
issue in R&R Capital.
Regardless of the tension apparent from these cases, if contracting parties decide on a deadlock avoidance mechanism in their planning documents,
they, at least implicitly, have decided to avoid seeking court intervention
based on deadlock.189 Even if there is no explicit language of that seemingly
required by the court in Chance, a contract dealing with conflict avoidance
is a specific ex ante ordering of rights that should preclude courts from intervening even if a statute otherwise would permit them to do so.190 To this end,
the Gries model of staying a dissolution proceeding to let the agreed-upon
buy-out proceed honors careful advance planning the shareholders undertook.
Contract-based judicial decision-making also leads to a more efficient
result for the shareholders since courts need not examine the corporation’s
internal affairs to ascertain fault. Indeed, in deadlock claims, this rarely is a
core judicial function anyway. Deadlock is not a claim focused on wrongdoing;191 rather, it is procedural matter impacting corporate governance. Parties
can plan for management deadlock without impinging on public-policy concerns.192 Particularly given the General Assembly’s recognition of shareholder autonomy and primacy concerning the share-purchase remedy,193
186. Id. at 1279.
187. Id. at 1280.
188. Id.
189. Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders’ Reasonable Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L. Q. 193, 227 (1988) (advocating against a rule that bars dissolution
if there is a generic buy-sell agreement, unless the shareholders knowingly agreed specifically
to waive the right to seek dissolution).
190. See Midwest Television, Inc. v. Oloffson, 699 N.E.2d 230, 236 (Ill. App. Ct.
1998) (stating that waiver is the “voluntary relinquishment of a known right”).
191. See In re Goodman v. Lovett, 607 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
192. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1981(a)(3) (2016) (providing that in case of director
deadlock, courts may not appoint receiver or grant similar relief if shareholders “by agreement
or otherwise have provided for the appointment of a provisional director or other means for
the resolution of a deadlock . . . .”).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 137-49.
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courts should embrace contractual mechanisms that facilitate private deadlock solutions. A court’s function, when faced with an advance-planning
clause, is to ensure the shareholders adhere to it rather than supplant it with
a default statutory remedy that is waivable and textually disfavored.194
B.

The Limits of Ex Ante Planning

Though courts should enforce deadlock avoidance mechanisms liberally, those contractual clauses are uncommon. Consider the prototypical
business that is most suited for deadlock: the closely-held family firm, in
which management responsibility passes down from one generation to the
next. The 2014 PwC Family Business Survey revealed that fewer than thirty
percent of these family businesses have any conflict resolution mechanism.195
This statistic illustrates a truism known to experienced corporate counsel: the
businesses that most need contractual mechanisms to resolve conflict are the
ones least likely to have them.
Empirical data even suggest that companies with equally-divided ownership (and therefore an equally-divided board) are structurally flawed from
the outset. These flaws render them less likely to succeed than firms with an
unequal division of equity among founders. Research by Professors Noam
Wassermann and Thomas Hellmann confirms that equally-split companies
raise less outside funding from venture capitalists and have lower median
valuations.196 To this end, Wassermann and Hellman have concluded that
founders who decide on equal-share splits do so very quickly and that this
arrangement is “a symptom of bigger issues with the company.”197 Those
bigger issues illustrate that equal splitters are unable or unwilling to have
candid, thoughtful discussions about each other’s relative contributions to the
firm before deciding on how much of the business they should own.198
As the early empirical research conducted by Wassermann and Hellmann describes, it is nearly impossible for owners of a startup to understand
and anticipate each other’s value over the enterprise’s lifespan.199 They postulate:
194. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
195. See 2014 Family Business Survey – Explore the Data, PWC GLOBAL,
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/family-business/family-business-survey/explore-thedata.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
196. Louise Lee, Beware Startups Where the Founders Have Equal Stakes, WALL ST.
J., May 2, 2016, at R3 (citing research for forthcoming publication).
197. See Wassermann & Hellmann, supra note 174.
198. Id.
199. See Thomas Hellmann and Noam Wassermann, The First Deal: The Division of
Founder Equity in New Ventures 5 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-085, 2012),
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/14-085_2bd67a49-bd41-4396-a69d73a7f40829b8.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WMC-EZ8W].
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Founder negotiations occur at a time when there is
extreme uncertainty; in the early life of a startup,
technology, products and markets are often ill-defined. As a result, founders have a highly incomplete understanding of the skills and tasks that the
venture will need. In addition, founders don’t know
each other’s true skills and commitment, nor their
compatibility as a team. As a consequence, there is
considerable uncertainty, and ample room for disagreement about what the true differences among
founders will turn out to be.200
The foundational flaw in the equally-divided firm, then, is that the even
split stems from a hastily-reached decision meant to avoid conflict and to
eschew difficult decision-making about the firm and the founders’ management rights. This decisional matrix increases the likelihood that the owners
will be unable to plan for dissension or, worse, remediate dissension when it
arises.201
Professor Robert B. Thompson has a similar theory about why equal
firms may be structurally deficient, though he focuses more on ex ante perceptions of trust among founders. In Professor Thompson’s view, “Investors
often fail to anticipate the failure of their enterprise, or they demonstrate an
overly optimistic trust in those with whom they are undertaking the venture.”202 His observation reinforces Simon’s theory of bounded rationality.
That is, owners may know their new business lacks formality or appropriate
planning, but they nevertheless make the informed decision that it is simply
good enough under the circumstances.203 This initial trust among stakeholders—at its zenith when a new business starts—can obscure the need to plan
for touchy subjects, not the least of which is the possibility of deadlock.204
200. Id.
201. See William J. Carney, The Theory of the Firm: Investor Coordination Costs,
Control Premiums and Capital Structure, 65 WASH U. L. Q. 1, 59-60 (1987) (discussing Simon’s theory of bounded rationality and incidence of investor conflicts in the closely-held
firm).
202. See Thompson, supra note 189, at 199.
203. See Carney, supra note 201, at 60 (stating that the “initial glow of enthusiasm for
a new business may prevent investors from reflecting fully upon” planning problems).
204. See Katia Savchuk, Inside the Nasty Corporate Divorce Between Ex-Lovers Who
Built a Company Worth Nearly $1 Billion, FORBES (May 25, 2016, 8:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/katiasavchuk/2016/05/25/liz-elting-transperfect-engaged-cofounders-phil-shawe-corporate-divorce/#37bd98752c2e [https://perma.cc/BH68-H7E5] (describing how founders of TransPerfect split business 50/50 and “never drew up a buy-sell
agreement or cemented their roles on paper”).

2018]

DISSOLUTION AND RATIONAL CHOICE

381

When litigation ensues, it often becomes apparent that the founders never
informed themselves of their rights, duties, and obligations to the enterprise.205
Coupled with unbridled optimism, the shareholders may also forego
sound legal advice during the firm’s planning stage.206 Indeed, it is quite common for new business owners to choose corporate counsel to draft a standard
set of corporate documents that lack customization to the founders’ particular
business. Often times, counsel is not even familiar with her client’s proposed
business model or simply will follow instructions to stay out of the way.207
And neither the lawyer nor the individual owners may fully appreciate whom
the lawyer actually is representing—a particular owner or the firm itself.208
Shareholders tend to view legal formalities as a waste of time and resources,
preferring instead to focus on setting an infrastructure—vendors, customers,
and operating systems—that will support their new firm.209 Their failure to
procure sound legal advice supports the conclusions of Professors Wassermann, Hellmann, and Thompson that behavioral constraints significantly
limit shareholders’ capacity to plan.210 These constraints gird deadlock disputes and help suggest to courts which remedial options are most appropriate.
C.

Revisiting Section 12.56: Shareholders’ Reasonable Expectations

If owners’ limited capacity to plan for management deadlock informs a
court’s willingness to consider certain remedial options, then so too should
the concept of shareholders’ reasonable expectations. This premise is firmly
embedded within section 12.56:

205. See Inca Materials, Inc. v. Indigo Constr. Servs., No. 1-14-1345, 2015 WL
6955213, at *15 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 10, 2015) (“The case . . . involved a group of people who
entered into a business arrangement without discussing the details, without considering their
ensuing duties, without making a sufficient effort to keep themselves apprised of how the
business was operating, and without asking questions when questions needed to be asked.”).
206. See J.A.C. Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems, and Needs of the
Close Corporation, 1969 U. ILL. L. F. 1, 17-18 (1969) (discussing that minority shareholder
stock purchases are “likely to be arranged without either party consulting a lawyer. The result
is the assumption of a minority stock position without, or with only limited, appreciation of
the risks involved.”).
207. See Carney, supra note 201, at 60 (noting corporate lawyers provide incomplete
organizational advice for fear of “queering the deal”).
208. See Christopher P. Clasby, The Ethics of Representing Corporations, ILL. B. J.,
June 2016, at 40, 41 (noting that identifying the proper client “can be confusing because the
lawyer acts at the direction of the corporation’s duly authorized constituents. As such, lawyers
and the authorized constituents may forget about the actual client and where their loyalties
lie.”).
209. See Wassermann & Hellmann, supra note 174.
210. See Thompson, supra note 189, at 224.
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In determining the appropriate relief to order pursuant to this Section, the court may take into consideration the reasonable expectations of the corporation’s shareholders as they existed at the time the
corporation was formed and developed during the
course of the shareholders’ relationship with the
corporation and with each other.211
The reasonable-expectations provision is a feature of both the BCA and
other states’ corporations laws.212 Aside from stating simply that a court may
consider shareholder expectations when ordering relief, the BCA offers no
guidance as to what the term “reasonable expectations” actually means or
how to apply it to remedial choice.213 But in the closely-held firm, the expectations that shareholders have—either objectively viewed or subjectively expressed—no doubt factor into the overall remedial mix.
A shareholder’s reasonable expectations in a closely-held firm generally
are imbued with certain fundamental features. Those features are notably different than what a shareholder tends to expect out of a passive investment in
a publicly-traded organization.214 In particular, shareholders expect symmetry, rather than separation, between ownership and management.215 They
further expect continuing employment, a reasonable salary, dividends, and a
restriction on their partners’ ability to transfer ownership in the firm to outsiders.216
Shareholder expectations concerning management in an equally-split
corporation derive largely from the decisions they make—or perhaps more
accurately, avoid making—when structuring the firm. By agreeing to equal
economic and management rights, a court reasonably can determine that the
shareholders expect to have full veto authority over corporate action. Or,
stated differently, a court can conclude that the equal shareholders expect to
agree on all decisions that impact the firm’s strategic direction. This conclusion comports with the objective theory of contract, in which courts determine intent by examining the language of the governing agreement.217 To be
sure, the concepts of intent and shareholder expectations are synonymous.
211. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(d) (2017).
212. See, e.g., Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch
Co., 645 P.2d 929 (Mont. 1982); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983). Some
states, like Illinois, set forth the “reasonable expectations” standard in their corporations statute. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115(5) (2017).
213. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(d) (2017).
214. See Israels, supra note 13, at 778-79 (discussing commonly held expectations of
shareholders in closely-held firm).
215. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 558 (citing F. Hodge O’Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 BUS. LAW 873, 885 (1978)).
216. See Thompson, supra note 189, at 194, 196.
217. Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg. Inc., 870 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 1989).
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An ex ante planning model that enables an equal owner’s full veto power is
the best objective reflection of the owners’ reasonable expectations concerning firm management.
In terms of remediating deadlock, the concept of reasonable expectations becomes murky. Those expectations may develop long after the entity’s
formation and may be little more than a post hoc reflection of the external
constraints described by Professors Wassermann, Hellmann, and Thompson.
That is to say, if the owners’ planning decisions and organizational documents facilitate deadlock, a petitioning shareholder may expect that a court
will step in and order the business dissolved. But she may never gain that
expectation until deadlock is apparent. To that end, the concept of reasonable
expectations in a deadlock suit simply may start and end with the terms of
the parties’ organizational documents. Courts may interpret the parties’ failure to plan for deadlock in advance as a tacit expression that dissolution is
within their reasonable expectations, particularly since that remedy is available by default under section 12.56.218
VI. RECONSTRUCTING THE MODEL: DISSOLUTION AS A DEFAULT REMEDY
Because behavioral constraints limit advance planning in an equallysplit firm, it is understandable that many corporate contracts will not address
management deadlock. Even if this failure to plan amounts to a tacit concession that courts should remediate deadlock, a more fundamental question persists: Why would a shareholder prefer dissolution as a remedy for director
deadlock instead of simply cashing out of the firm? The answer should inform courts’ view of dissolution as a default remedy for deadlock cases.
A.

Dissolution as a Motivating Force

The principal motivation for why a shareholder would seek an order of
dissolution in lieu of a buy-out remedy stems from the shareholder’s need to
avoid forward-looking conduct restrictions. Under Illinois law, those restrictions arise from two related sources: contractual restrictive covenants
and default fiduciary duty rules.

218. See In re Collins-Doan Co., 70 A.2d 159, 166 (N.J. 1949) (construing statutory
dissolution procedure for corporations and noting that in case of deadlocked directors “[c]ertainly, dissolution was within the contemplation of the shareholders here if differences arose
which could not be composed.”). But cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, CORPORATION LAW AND
ECONOMICS 830 (2002) (“[P]arties who want liberal dissolution rights may bargain for them .
. . before investing.”).

384

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

38-1

1. Shareholder-Based Restrictive Covenants
Shareholder agreements often contain covenants not to compete.219
Triggering events for a shareholder-based covenant can include retirement,
termination of employment, or the sale of shares (whether to the firm, the
remaining shareholders, or an outside party). Courts in Illinois enforce these
transactional-based covenants with regularity and without the heightened
level of scrutiny associated with employment-based restraints.220
The most compelling discussion for why courts enforce covenants in
shareholder agreements comes from Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Hess
Newmark Owens Wolf, Inc. v. Owens.221 The court there noted the benefit
that restrictive covenants provided to the ownership group:
But for the restrictive covenant, each of the three
[shareholders] would face not only the business
risks endemic to the venture but also the risk that
one or more of the other principals would bolt and
leave the others with neither a viable business at
[their firm] nor another business to go back to . . . .
Keeping a personal-services business together can
be difficult without the sort of trust and confidence
engendered by promises to stick with the firm rather
than strike off on one’s own at the first opportunity.222
As Judge Easterbrook’s opinion illustrates, the rationale for endorsing,
rather than striking, restrictive covenants in shareholder agreements is that
“those who have an equity stake in a venture need to secure the loyalty of
those similarly situated to themselves.”223 Should the shareholders of a
219. See, e.g., Hasley v. Harrell, 971 So.2d 149, 151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (action
to enforce covenants not to compete in employee and stockholder agreements); Wainwright’s
Travel Serv., Inc. v. Schmolk, 500 A. 2d 476, 477-79 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (same; discussing
reasonableness of covenant tied to stock ownership).
220. See Cent. Water Works Supply, Inc. v. Fisher, 608 N.E.2d 618, 622-23 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1993) (concluding restrictive covenant in shareholder agreement was more akin to covenant ancillary to sale of business); Eichmann v. Nat’l Hosp. & Health Care Servs., 719 N.E.2d
1141, 1145-46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (describing different standards for enforcement of employment- and transactional-based restrictive covenants).
221. Hess Newmark Owens Wolf, Inc. v. Owens, 415 F.3d 630 (7th Cir. 2005).
222. Id. at 631.
223. See Kenneth J. Vanko, Non-Compete In Shareholder Agreement Found Unenforceable (Lampman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assoc.), LEGAL DEV. NON-COMPETITION
AGREEMENTS (Mar. 27, 2009, 10:04 AM), http://www.non-competes.com/2009/03/non-compete-in-shareholder-agreement.html [https://perma.cc/E7TM-D9MD].
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closely-held firm agree in advance to restrictive covenants, a shareholder
may conclude the risk of leaving to compete simply is too great. The potential
for staring down a coercive injunction, as well as steep litigation costs, incents the shareholder to stay. And although courts sometimes find shareholder-based restrictive covenants unenforceable, 224 the prevailing test in Illinois favors enforcement of freely-negotiated documents between sophisticated business people with equal bargaining power.
2. Common-Law Fiduciary Duties
Shareholders of an equally-divided firm may be constrained even if
their planning documents omit a restrictive covenant altogether. Illinois law
is less than clear on what level of fiduciary duties shareholders in a closelyheld corporation owe each other and the firm. But in a company where the
shareholders retain equal shares and an equal say in management, the law
seems to favor expansive fiduciary obligations akin to those of true partners.
The principal fiduciary-duty case that will inform a shareholder’s decision to
leave and compete is Hagshenas v. Gaylord.225 Bruce Hagshenas, a fifty-percent shareholder and director of a small business, filed a dissolution action
due to management deadlock.226 Eventually, he resigned as both an officer
and director, starting up a competing firm in the process.227 Hagshenas then
hired employees away and solicited his company’s customers, all while the
dissolution proceeding remained pending.228
The Appellate Court of Illinois relied on a prior Supreme Court of Illinois decision, Illinois Rockford Corp. v. Kulp,229 in holding that Hagshenas
had a continuing fiduciary duty to both the firm and its shareholders.230 At
their core, Hagshenas and Kulp found that shareholders in a closely-held corporation with equal voting power were similar to partners, a finding that undoubtedly is pragmatic and correct.231 For its part, the court in Hagshenas
also noted Bruce’s great influence and continued control over the business as
a fifty-percent owner.232 This dictum caused subsequent courts to restrain

224. See Lampman v. DeWolff Boberg & Assocs., 319 Fed. App’x 293, 301-02 (4th
Cir. 2009) (finding three-year restrictive covenant in shareholder agreement was unenforceable due to problem with definition of what constituted “Competition”).
225. Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
226. Id. at 317.
227. Id. at 319.
228. Id.
229. Ill. Rockford Corp. v. Kulp, 242 N.E.2d 228 (Ill. 1968).
230. Hagshenas, 557 N.E.2d at 323.
231. Id. at 322; Kulp, 244 N.E.2d at 233 (citing Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482
(D.C. Cir. 1957) and Sher v. Sandler, 90 N.E.2d 536 (Mass. 1950)).
232. Hagshenas, 557 N.E.2d at 323.
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Hagshenas’ potential reach, qualifying to a large degree the extent of a shareholder’s fiduciary obligations in a closely-held firm.233 The confusion in Illinois law concerning shareholder-based fiduciary duties, though, applies
mainly to minority shareholders. Because of Hagshenas and Kulp, a shareholder who owns fifty percent of the firm’s stock likely retains a broad fiduciary duty not to compete, again equivalent to that of a partner, even if the
company’s planning documents lack an express restrictive covenant.234
The General Assembly, in delayed response to Hagshenas, enacted a
procedural route for shareholders to terminate their fiduciary duties. Section
7.90 of the BCA allows a shareholder to resign and terminate her fiduciary
duties to a corporation.235 The shareholder must irrevocably waive her right
to vote any of the firm’s shares, to be elected a director or officer, and to
control corporate actions.236 The statutory waiver device, though, may be an
imperfect solution for a shareholder in a deadlocked corporation. Even if the
shareholder can walk away and terminate her fiduciary duties, she will still
cede control of key assets to her business partner. A shareholder may perceive this concession as inequitable, since her expectations going into the
venture were to have equal say in both economic and management rights for
the firm.237 Since deadlock is not a fault-based claim, this inequity suggests
few shareholders will use section 7.90 as an extrajudicial remedy.
B.

Shareholder Motivations and Election of Remedies

Conduct restrictions, therefore, dictate remedial choice. Dissolution, if
granted, will free the shackles that contracts or the common law may impose
on a fifty-percent shareholder.238 A buy-out remedy, on the other hand, only
further increases the uncertainty that may await a petitioning shareholder in
terms of what ventures she is able to exploit.

233. See, e.g., Dowell v. Bitner, 652 N.E.2d 1372, 1379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (finding
minority shareholder who owned twenty-three percent of firm’s equity did not owe fiduciary
duty because he did not have the ability to control, hinder, or influence the corporation).
234. See Apex Med. Research, AMR, Inc. v. Arif, 145 F. Supp. 3d 814, 840 (N.D. Ill.
2015) (declining to find that fifty-percent shareholder owed fiduciary duty to corporation as a
matter of law).
235. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.90 (2017).
236. Id.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 211-18.
238. Cf. Dremco, Inc. v. S. Chapel Hill Gardens, Inc. 654 N.E.2d 501, 507 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1995) (dissolution ends fiduciary obligations of partnership except for winding up of affairs).
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To this end, if a shareholder petitions a court for a buy-out of her shares
under subsection (11), a court may condition a fair-value payment on compliance with restrictive covenants.239 This condition may be the continuation
of a pre-existing contractual arrangement or a judicial acknowledgment that
the covenant is necessary to protect the sale of firm goodwill. Either way, the
impact is the same. The mere potential for having to abide by a restriction
(even if the parameters of that restriction are unknown) will inform a shareholder’s decision whether to seek a buy-out in the first place. To be certain,
a court hearing a deadlock case could strike any subsisting non-compete or
not order it as a condition of share-purchase remedy.240 But fair value is the
standard for a share-purchase remedy under section 12.56.241 And fair value
normally includes a goodwill component, which a restrictive covenant in theory protects.242
In the case of the profitable enterprise, fair value should exceed liquidation value because a going-concern enterprise should attract a third-party purchaser’s interest at a level above what a pure sale of its component assets
would net. Assuming a deadlock case yields a judgment of dissolution, the
shareholders will only receive liquidation value less administrative expenses.243 So when a shareholder elects a buy-out remedy and foregoes any
request for dissolution, a court may be tempted to order some sort of a restrictive covenant on the selling shareholder to compensate the buyer for paying the higher price―that is, the price above pure liquidation value.
From the petitioning shareholder’s perspective, the value of avoiding
non-compete obligations (whether one exists or is judicially ordered as part
of a share-purchase remedy) should exceed any difference between fair value
and liquidation value for her equity. It is hard to see, though, how great of a
difference there would be between fair value and liquidation value in a broken enterprise–one that is so broken it cannot function. The shareholder who
seeks dissolution, too, may reasonably believe that going-concern value will
not actually be lost if she remains free to compete, able to hire some of the
firm’s employees, and even embark on a foregone strategic course of action.244
239. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(e)(3) (2017) (noting that court may specify
terms of share purchase, including the imposition of a covenant not to compete on the seller).
240. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(c), (e)(11) (2017).
241. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b)(11), (e)(5) (2017).
242. Labor Ready, Inc. v. Williams Staffing, LLC, 149 F. Supp. 2d 398, 407 (N.D. Ill.
2001).
243. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.60(e) (2017).
244. But see Jackson v. Nicolai-Neppach Co., 348 P.2d 9, 22 (Or. 1959) (affirming
dismissal of dissolution action and noting that denial of relief “may well lead to a fairer buysell agreement than the remedy of enforced liquidation, a remedy which might destroy the
going concern value of the plant and give both parties an unduly small return for the value of
their investment.”).
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Put another way, a dissolved firm will not result in the total dissipation
of existing goodwill if one or more shareholders purchases key assets and
continues some aspect of the business.245 Using a pure economic analysis, a
shareholder should choose to seek a dissolution judgment instead of a buyout remedy if the fair value of her shares is less than the sum of enterprise
liquidation value and potential goodwill recapture, minus any incremental
litigation cost necessary to proceed with dissolution and the subsequent
wind-up.246
A petitioning shareholder likely cannot make a pure economic decision
on whether to proceed with a requested buy-out or dissolution, principally
because she will not be able to assess two intangible factors: (1) the benefit
of being free from restrictive covenants or default fiduciary-duty rules; and
(2) the opportunity cost of being stuck in a dysfunctional and sinking firm.
These factors may weigh more heavily in her decision than any one data point
capable of rough quantification. In the unusual case where the difference between fair value and liquidation value is significant (such that the economic
equation may tilt against dissolution), a petitioning shareholder retains the
option to request a buy-out and the risk of having a restrictive covenant judicially ordered. The equities may prevent a court from conditioning a sale on
a broad non-compete obligation, but it’s nonetheless a gamble for the shareholder.
A buy-out remedy also may be insufficient for strategic business reasons, irrespective of whether a shareholder must honor a restrictive covenant.
For instance, a departing shareholder (even if able to compete) may lose control of strategic assets such as key business locations, custom equipment, intellectual property, websites, and customer intangibles. Recruiting employees to leave will be a challenge (particularly if they are bound to their own
individual restrictive covenants). And vendors may have to honor exclusive
supply contracts with the legacy corporation. Even a buy-out at fair value
may enable the incumbent shareholder to gain a tactical upper-hand by retaining some degree of control over these strategic assets, making the petitioning shareholder’s job much more difficult in competing. Counting on a
court to value intangible assets is a chore, to be sure, since valuation is more

245. For a discussion concerning the tax implications of a goodwill liquidation following dissolution, see generally Norwalk v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 208 (1998) (distribution
of accounting firm’s customer-based intangibles following liquidation did not trigger gain to
shareholders, since dissolved entity possessed no corporate goodwill).
246. Just how much more expensive a dissolution proceeding is, as opposed to one
focused on a buy-out, is hard to say. The parties will need to factor in wind-up costs, particularly the need to pay any appointed receiver’s fees. But conversely, where the petitioning
shareholder seeks a buy-out, the cost of obtaining expert opinions on enterprise fair value is
sure to be significant.
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of an art than a science. There is, too, the element of pride. A departing shareholder may worry that third-parties will perceive her as having been ousted
in unceremonious fashion.
C.

The Partnership Analogy

An important reference point for the dissolution remedy springs from
the long-held view that a closely-held corporation is akin to a partnership.247
This Article is not meant to reopen the long-simmering debate of whether
partnership law should apply to facets of closely-held corporations.248 The
bottom line is that, in Illinois, it does.249 Lawyers and litigants rightfully can
debate the partnership fiduciary-duty analogy from Hagshenas and Kulp. But
as I have illustrated above, Illinois fiduciary-duty law informs remedial
choice, and Hagshenas and Kulp have a great deal to say about that. Becaue
both decisions rely upon partnership law principles to vest controlling shareholders with broad fiduciary duties,250 courts should examine partners’ dissolution rights as authoritative when considering the proper remedy for deadlock in a closely-held corporation.
Under the Uniform Partnership Act (1997), a partner can dissolve the
firm at will, meaning she can terminate the partnership simply by tendering
her “express will to withdraw as a partner.”251 True, a partnership agreement
need not be at-will; partners can contract around automatic dissolution
rights—just like shareholders can through their contractual arrangements.252
But the default rule applicable to true partnerships endorses dissolution absent advance contract planning, presenting partners with much more expansive remedial choice in the event of deadlock.253 If partners’ fiduciary duties
247. See Doherty v. Kahn, 682 N.E.2d 163, 175 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (noting that shareholders were directors and officers, and also participated in day-to-day operations of close
corporation; finding that “[a]lthough Glen Regal was labeled as a corporation, it clearly was
an enterprise closely resembling a partnership.”).
248. Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 241-42, 249 (courts should not
use partnership law to supply contractual gaps for closely-held corporations), with John A.C.
Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1977) (closely-held
corporations are akin to partnerships, and partnership law provides better governance rules
than does corporation law).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 225-37.
250. Ill. Rockford Corp. v. Kulp, 242 N.E.2d 228, 233 (Ill. 1968); Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316, 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); See also Anest v. Audino, 773 N.E.2d 202,
209 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (“Shareholders in a close corporation owe to each other fiduciary
duties similar to those of partners in a partnership.”).
251. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 206/801(1) (2017).
252. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 206/801(2)-(3) (2017).
253. Whalen v. Stephens, 61 N.E. 921, 928-29 (Ill. 1901) (noting that dissolution of
partnership is proper when relations would render it impracticable to conduct the business).
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are indistinguishable from those held by equal shareholders in a closely-held
corporation, it seems difficult to reconcile the disparate treatment nominally
afforded the dissolution remedy.254
The conditions I have proposed for the dissolution remedy harmonize
this disparate treatment by giving primacy to advance planning and by recognizing the unique contours of the BCA’s share-purchase remedy. To be
clear, I am not advocating a textual abandonment of section 12.56 or a broad
endorsement of dissolution as a normal-course remedy. Indeed, dissolution
upon shareholder request is presumptively appropriate only when a petitioner
proves deadlock and only for corporations that lie close to partnerships (in
substance if not in form). On this edge of the organizational continuum, the
risk of exploitation and opportunism between shareholders is low because
they actively manage the business and, absent advance planning, volitionally
retain full veto power over corporate decisions.255
D.

Third-Party Interests

That only leaves a final assessment of what may be the most compelling
reason for declining to enter a dissolution judgment: the potential for collateral damage, such as the impact a judgment may have on innocent third-parties like employees.256 This should pose less of an issue than it might appear
at first blush, particularly if the parties are likely to continue with the business
simply by reorganizing and recapitalizing separate entities.
To this end, the binary election-of-remedies question driven by section
12.56’s text should guide a court. If a petitioning shareholder declines to elect
a buy-out and is motivated by obtaining a release from a shareholder-based
covenant or partnership-like fiduciary duties, then she is signaling her intent
to recapture some aspect of the firm’s goodwill that otherwise may be lost in
a fire-sale liquidation. Any trepidation courts may face from causing thirdparty injury must be tempered by the reality that core pieces of the dissolved
entity will resurface and rebound quickly.
Moreover, courts will need to examine any concern for non-shareholder
employees in tandem with the employment at-will doctrine257 and by the fact
254. Larry E. Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation, 65 WASH. U.
L.Q. 357, 397 (1987) (noting that partners should have judicial liquidation rights on showing
of deadlock).
255. Id. at 380.
256. Struckhoff v. Echo Ridge Farm, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that courts “should consider the effect the dissolution would have on the public as
well as the shareholders.”); Jackson v. Nicolai-Neppach Co., 348 P.2d 9, 22 (Or. 1959) (noting
public interest in preserving employment).
257. See Michael v. Precision All. Grp., LLC, 21 N.E.3d 1183, 1188 (Ill. 2014) (noting
at-will employee may be discharged at any time and for any reason).
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that few employees will want to work for what they perceive to be a sinking
ship. In fact, the firm’s employees may want a dissolution order, so they can
pick their best landing spot – and perhaps void their own existing restrictive
covenants. A remedial analysis that is excessively focused on third-party interests may fail to account for “deadwill,” or the unknowable drag that corporate dysfunction and paralysis has on entity participants.258
Courts, too, may express concern about the impact of a dissolution judgment on executory contracts, like commercial leases. Many commercial contracts provide that a corporate dissolution constitutes an event of default or
will result in an automatic termination with no cure right.259 For corporations
that resemble partnerships, the impact on third-parties may not be particularly great if: (1) the shareholders have extended personal guaranties; (2)
those shareholders are likely to pick up some aspects of the dissolved business (and therefore enter into replacement agreements); or (3) the third-party
can be made whole during the corporation’s wind-up process.260
E.

The Default Remedy Paradigm

Since a petitioner may be motivated to avoid conduct restrictions
through a potential share-purchase order, it is difficult not to see dissolution
as a preferred remedy under section 12.56 for deadlock cases. But this is so
only when two conditions are present: (1) the petitioning shareholder decides
not to request a share-purchase remedy; and (2) the shareholders have not
agreed ex ante in their governing contracts to a deadlock avoidance mechanism. If condition (1) is present, the responding shareholder need not make
an election to purchase the petitioner’s shares.261 In such a case, the responding party’s failure to elect a share-purchase remedy is tantamount to a concession that the corporation is not worth continuing. Absent the right to conduct an auction of the business, courts should then view dissolution as truly

258. Relatedly, the plain language of section 12.56 places no weight on third-party
interests, as it instructs a court that it may consider the shareholders’ reasonable expectations.
By omitting third-party interests, the General Assembly has not authorized a court to consider
how dissolution may affect non-parties to the case. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(d) (2017).
259. See, e.g., Equimark Comm. Fin. Co. v. C.I.T. Fin. Servs. Corp., 812 F.2d 141,
144 (3d Cir. 1987) (underlying portfolio agreement’s event of default was petition for dissolution); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Wm. V. Schmidt Co., No. 10 Civ. 4926 (NRB), 2011 WL
1334844, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2011) (under business loan agreement, “event of default”
included dissolution of entity as a going-concern business).
260. See infra text accompanying notes 272-78.
261. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(f) (2017) (providing that 90-day election right is
discretionary).
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the presumptive default remedy if the petitioner succeeds in proving deadlock.262
Courts, too, should adapt the concept of reasonable shareholders’ expectations to the unique deadlock paradigm and the proper remedy for proven
deadlock. On this score, courts should conclude that the failure to plan contractually for management deadlock amounts to a mutually-held, objective
expectation that a court is the only institution capable of effectuating appropriate relief for deadlock. The absence of a deadlock avoidance mechanism
in corporate planning documents, particularly when a complete remedy is
available by statute, is certainly no reason for courts to avoid ordering dissolution.263 The shareholders’ decision to retain full management veto authority
is an express grant of power for courts to step in when the exercise of that
authority leads to going-concern injury. Courts are fully equipped to act as a
gatekeeper when shareholders fail to contract around the possibility of management deadlock.264
In this regard, the less sophisticated the corporate planning documents
(and even the parties themselves), the greater the role courts have to order
relief that extricates owners from a failed endeavor.265 Dissolution as a remedial device is directly proportional to how carefully those stakeholders
planned for deadlock when they ordered the firm’s management. If they did
not, dissolution is the only remedy to fix a broken enterprise absent a petitioner’s buy-out request.266 Despite the superficial appeal of directorial appointments as a deadlock cure, this remedy suffers from significant limitations, not the least of which is the ongoing supervisory role a court would

262. A responding party, too, could file a counterclaim that concedes deadlock and
request that the petitioner (now the counter-defendant) buy her out for fair value. This may be
a tactically unsound move, of course, if the responding shareholder wants to remain in the
corporation’s line of business. And it would cause the petitioner to engage in a separate decisional analysis about which remedy to seek—dissolution or a reverse of the very buy-out she
sought to avoid.
263. Judges have no reason to shy away from ordering dissolution, as they often play
a role in ordering litigants’ contractual affairs. See Martindell v. Lake Shore Nat’l Bank, 154
N.E.2d 683, 690 (Ill. 1958) (applying implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing);
Weitekamp v. Lane, 620 N.E.2d 454, 461 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (noting courts’ ability to modify
overbroad non-compete covenants to fit the asserted business interest at stake).
264. See Thompson, supra note 189, at 224.
265. Cf. R&R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC,
2008 WL 3846318, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008) (noting that the “allure of the limited liability company . . . would be eviscerated if [sophisticated] parties could simply petition this
court to renegotiate their agreements when relationships sour.”).
266. See Israels, supra note 13, at 791 (noting preference for judicial authority to permit acquisition of petitioner’s stock by defendant at appraised value).
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play in the firm’s management and the inevitability of simply kicking the can
down the road.267
Courts also have little incentive to force shareholders to remain in a
dysfunctional, deadlocked organization, particularly when the proof establishes either irreparable injury to the organization or that it no longer can be
conducted to the shareholders’ general advantage.268 If irreconcilable discord
persists among the directors, then forcing the competing factions to remain
bound together simply because corporations are perpetual entities yields little, if any, social benefit.269 Entrepreneurs retain flexibility to choose their
form of entity and almost infinite choices in structuring their planning documents.270 The need to preserve the sanctity of the corporate form should not
override pragmatic factors that weigh in favor of dissolution.271
F.

Procedural Aspects of Obtaining a Dissolution Order

The limits of a share-purchase remedy, therefore, dramatically increase
the odds that a dissolution order is the only proportional relief for true deadlock in an Illinois corporation. Obtaining a judgment, though, is only the
start. Counsel for any petitioning shareholder who succeeds in her objective
must understand the path that lies ahead. Several considerations must be
taken into account.
First, it is important to distinguish between the concept of dissolution
and a winding-up of the corporate affairs. Dissolution is the point at which a
corporation ceases to carry on its business, and the wind-up of a business
settles the corporate affairs after dissolution.272 Put differently, a corporation
may conduct business after dissolution only to the extent necessary to wind

267. See TransPerfect Glob., Inc. v. Elting (In re Shawe & Elting, LLC), C.A. No.
9661-CB, 2015 WL 4874733, at *31 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015), aff’d, 157 A.3d 152 (Del.
2017); Kim, supra note 113, at 140-41; supra text accompanying notes 110-30.
268. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(a)(1) (2017); see also Thomas J. Bamonte, Should
the Illinois Courts Care About Corporate Deadlock, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 625, 644 (1998)
(discussing how section 12.56’s injury standard weeds out “deadlocks that are the result of the
working of corporate democracy or that have little impact on the operation of the company.”).
269. See McDonald, supra note 4, at 814.
270. See Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law,
60 SMU L. REV. 383, 384 (2007) (discussing contractarian theory and how corporate law
“provides a series of convenient, off-the-rack default rules most corporations will find useful
to follow most of the time.”); Larry E. Ribstein, The Uncorporation’s Domain, 55 VILL. L.
REV. 125 (2010) (discussing factors that lead owners to choose between corporate and uncorporate forms, like the limited liability company).
271. See Murdock, supra note 74, at 441; Israels, supra note 13, at 793.
272. Cole Taylor Bank v. Ratner (In re Ratner), 146 B.R. 211, 216 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1992).
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up its affairs.273 Illinois law requires that the dissolved business collect its
assets, discharge liabilities, and distribute what remains—either in kind or in
cash—proportionate to the shareholders’ interests.274
Second, a wind-up raises the possibility of the court appointing a liquidating receiver. Such an appointment is entirely up to the judge who orders
dissolution.275 Depending on the language of any court order, a receiver
would: (a) collect all assets and have the authority to sell them privately or at
a public sale; (b) sue in the corporate name to collect amounts owed to the
corporation; and (c) pay all liabilities.276 The corporation bears the expenses
associated with a liquidating receiver’s services,277 so the parties (despite
their disagreements) may consider trying to manage any liquidation on their
own, particularly if the assets are easy to collect and administer. Of course,
if the acrimony permeates the corporation, a judge may not let them attempt
a wind-up.278
Third, a dissolution order is final and appealable under Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 303.279 In federal court, the doctrine of “effective finality” may
render a dissolution order appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 even before the
actual liquidation and wind-up process begins.280 Therefore, a party who believes that a court improperly ordered judicial dissolution must seek a stay of
enforcement of the dissolution order (and wind-up) while the appeal is pending. Otherwise, the mechanics of a firm’s wind-up may moot the issues on
review, particularly if the shareholders begin competing enterprises or if the
dissolved firm’s equipment is sold to third-parties during the appeal’s pendency.281
273. Wilhelm v. McAnn’s W. 48th St. Rest. Corp., No. 01 C 7518, 2003 WL 41988,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2003) (applying New York law).
274. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.30 (2017).
275. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.60(e) (2017).
276. Id.
277. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.60(i) (2017).
278. A judge, too, may consider the parties’ ability to purchase corporate assets, such
as inventory or machinery. If a third-party is more likely to pay a higher price for those assets,
then the court may be more inclined to have a receiver auction them off.
279. See Callier v. Callier, 378 N.E.2d 405, 408 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
280. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 304, 306, 308-09 (1962) (in
challenge to merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act, concluding appellate jurisdiction existed when district court ordered acquiring company to divest itself of target’s stock and other
assets even though acquirer had yet to file specific divestiture plan for court’s approval).
281. See Kennedy v. Miller, 528 N.E.2d 406, 408 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (discussing circumstances when events make it impossible for reviewing court from ordering effective relief
on appeal). The parties also may want to consider seeking a stay of any dissolution order even
if the losing party declines to appeal. The reasons for doing so may depend on the type of
business in which the corporation is engaged. An order of dissolution may trigger an event of
default under a credit facility. And a firm engaged in a regulated business, such as insurance
or financial services, may face serious consequences if it is dissolved before customer accounts are transitioned appropriately. Implementing a stay in the dissolution order to enable
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Fourth, the corporation is a necessary party to any dissolution proceeding, even if the competing shareholders/directors are adequately and fully
represented. 282 Conceivably, the court hearing a dissolution suit could appoint counsel to represent the entity. However, it is not certain what this
would achieve, other than another layer of administrative cost. Typically,
corporate counsel reports to the board of directors. If that board is equally
divided and truly deadlocked, counsel cannot report to it or obtain any authority to act. More likely, the corporation simply would be a nominal defendant.283
Fifth, the judgment order should specifically state that the court finds
that none of the alternative remedies listed in section 12.56(b) is sufficient to
resolve the corporation’s deadlock. Though nothing in section 12.56 requires
this language in a judgment order,284 it is wise practice for the trial court to
enter this finding on the record particularly if the matter proceeds to appeal.
VII. CONCLUSION
The dissolution paradigm that I have proposed in this Article harmonizes not only the text of section 12.56 itself, but also the essential factors
endemic to deadlock cases: the extent of advance contract planning, the availability of a share-purchase remedy, conduct restrictions, shareholder expectations, and third-party interests. The oft-repeated characterization of dissolution as an extreme remedy devolves from sources extrinsic to the unique
deadlock paradigm. The better remedial analysis focuses on this paradigm
and allows judges to view dissolution as an essential and entirely proper tool
to resolve deadlock in closely-held firms.

seamless client service could ameliorate the impact of a dissolution order, particularly if the
principals remain in the firms’ general line of business.
282. Glickauf v. Moss, 320 N.E.2d 132, 135 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
283. See Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1319 (D. S.C. 1987) (noting defendant
made motion to add corporation as nominal party to dissolution proceeding); Miller v. Miller,
C.A. No. 2140-VCN, 2008 WL 372469, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2008) (describing deadlocked
corporation as “nominal defendant”).
284. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b)(12) (2017).

